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ABSTRACT
Cook, Amanda C. PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. Essays on Health Insur-
ance. Major Professor: Stephen Martin.
Uninsured in Maryland:
Uninsured individuals receive fewer health care services for at least three reasons:
higher prices, responsibility for the entire bill, and potential provider reductions for
concern of non-payment. This study isolates differences in service levels between
insured and uninsured individuals that are attributed to different effective prices;
the uninsured pay the bill without a contribution from an insurance company. I
capitalize on Maryland’s highly regulated health care system, where prices are set by
the state, are uniform across all patients, and hospitals are compensated for free care
and bad debt, to isolate the difference in quantity demanded by the uninsured. While
the Oregon study compares Medicaid individuals and their low-income uninsured
counterparts, this paper considers income variation among the uninsured, quantifies
the difference in demand in an environment with uniform prices, and evaluates health
outcomes in light of these reductions. A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition estimates
uninsured individuals receive 8.4% fewer services after accounting for differences in
characteristics. Compared to insured patients, the uninsured are 74% as likely to be
readmitted. This difference in service level and readmission rates is larger for patients
residing in low-income zip codes and smaller in wealthy zip codes. This suggests
that income is a substantial constraint for uninsured patients, and as this constraint
relaxes, more services are demanded. For illnesses with a high risk of mortality, both
services demanded and readmission rates are not statistically different for insured
and uninsured individuals. Mortality rates are similar for insured and uninsured
individuals living in the bottom 75% of average income by zip code. Differences in
xiii
the top 25% seem to be attributable to small numbers of uninsured individuals. While
this paper analyses Maryland, it provides insight into demand for insured individuals
with high-deductible plans country wide. Prior to meeting their deductible, these
insured patients face similar conditions to uninsured patients in Maryland — they
have access to negotiated rates but are solely paying the bill.
Hospital Insurance bargaining:
In addition to risk-sharing, U.S. health insurance companies negotiate rates for ser-
vices with hospitals. The price of service can vary depending on which entity, if any, is
insuring the patient. Insurers (and possibly their customers) benefit from negotiating
through lower prices, while hospitals benefit through higher patient volume.
Using Massachusetts’ Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) data,
we use hospital and insurer characteristics to estimate negotiated prices specific to
hospital-insurer pairs. We investigate the relationship between two important quanti-
ties: (i) the charged amount that hospitals bill for their services, and (ii) the amount
that hospitals are paid for insured patients. These numbers differ because the former
is a function only of the services provided and the hospital’s “chargemaster” prices,
while the latter is the result of negotiation.
We find that payments for privately insured patients are on average 38% of charges
when payments are made on a fee-for-service basis. However this ratio varies greatly
by hospital and insurer. Compared to community hospitals without an emergency
room, academic medical centers are compensated 15% more for their services, and
hospitals with an emergency room are compensated 7% more than those without.
1
1. UNINSURED? A STUDY OF DIFFERENTIAL
SERVICES, RATES OF HOSPITAL READMISSION, AND
RISK OF MORTALITY IN MARYLAND.
1.1 Introduction
In most of the United States, prices for health care services are unregulated.
Therefore, if two identical individuals go to the same hospital, with the same illness,
at the same time, and receive the same services, but have different insurance cover-
age, their total payments to the hospital are likely to differ (Reinhardt (2011); White
et al. (2013)). This is because insurance companies, both private and governmental,
contract with hospitals to set prices for their enrollees. For uninsured patients, it
is not unusual for the hospital’s prices to be two to three times negotiated rates of
insured (White et al., 2013).
In the American health insurance industry, insurance serves two distinct func-
tions. The first is that of typical insurance: to reduce the financial risk to potential
patients by aggregating risk. The second function of American health insurance is
to negotiate rates for services received. With numerous insurance plans that have
varying amounts of market power, there is substantial variability in prices for the
same services, even among insured individuals. Uninsured individuals — with no
bargaining power — pay far more. Because of the tremendous variation in prices
for a single service, and with a great number of services provided at a hospital, one
cannot look at a hospital’s revenue and ‘back out’ the quantity of services provided in
an attempt to estimate demand. Differential pricing makes it difficult to determine
if having health insurance changes demand for health services. By capitalizing on an
environment with equal prices for all patients — Maryland’s health system — this
research determines if there is a difference in the quantity of services received, the
2
rates of readmission, and the rates of mortality for insured and uninsured individuals
for inpatient hospital visits in Maryland from 2011 to 2013.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I review the studies of in-
surance status and health care demand, readmissions, and mortality that are most
closely related to this work. In Section 1.3, I describe the unique approach to health
care regulation in the State of Maryland and explain how data generated in this
environment can shed new light on the insurance status-health market performance
relationship. In Section 1.4, I document the characteristics of the uninsured popu-
lation in Maryland. Section 1.5.1 presents the results of my statistical analysis, and
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Health Care Demand and Insurance Status
Previous studies have produced conflicting results on the relationship between in-
surance status and quantity of services received. Within the medical literature, White
et al. (2007) investigate an emergency room’s treatment of traumatic brain injury in
Rochester, NY and find limited evidence that insurance status affects patient care.
Bruen et al. (2013) find no differences in the average time spent with a primary care
provider based on insurance status. In the economics literature, Keeler and Rolph
(1988) use the RAND Health Insurance Experiment to highlight two dimensions to
the insurance-demand problem: while less-insured individuals sought less care, once
they did seek out care, their cost per episode was the same. While Keeler and Rolph
(1988) use different co-insurance rates to estimate sensitivity to price, the plans they
analyze have low out -of-pocket caps, so they don’t generalize to the experience of
an uninsured individual who is out of pocket for tens of thousands of dollars. These
works highlight the sensitivity of results to the measure of demand one is examining:
total volume per year, or services per episode of illness. This paper will focus on the
latter, specifically, patients who are sufficiently ill that they are admitted overnight
at a hospital for more than one night.
3
There are also a number of papers which suggest insurance status does affect
demand. In the medical literature, Weissman and Epstein (1993) study the effect
of insurance on descriptive, self-reported health outcomes and find that “source of
payment has a substantial effect on the amount, location, and even quality of care
received”.
In the economics literature, Manning et al. (1987) use the RAND Health Insur-
ance Experiment to calculate the demand elasticity for medical care and finds it to
be non-zero. Baicker et al. (2013) capitalize on a natural experiment in Oregon where
there were more individuals eligible for Medicaid than the state could fund. A lottery
was implemented. This provided a control group of uninsured persons, and a treated
group of insured persons with similar characteristics. They find that the treatment
group had substantially and statistically significantly higher health care utilization
but they did not find significant changes in visits to emergency department or hospital
admissions. Here, the increased service volume is a function of subsidized (near zero)
prices from having Medicaid. The uninsured, however, have no bargaining power
and, since Oregon is a state without price regulation, uninsured individuals stand
to pay very high amounts for service. In contrast, in this paper, by looking at an
environment with price controls, and where hospitals are compensated equally for
all patients, I can isolate the patient-driven reductions in demand and compare these
reductions between insured and uninsured individuals. I link different levels of service
to differences in long term health outcomes, namely readmissions and mortality.
1.2.2 Readmissions and Insurance Status
Due to patient confidentiality, readmissions have, historically, been difficult for
researchers to study. Within the medical literature, Philbin et al. (2001) examined
the relationship between income and readmission for heart failure. They found that
4
having a low income was a positive predictor for readmission. Hasan et al. (2010) look
at hospital readmission for general medical patients, and find that insurance status
is a predictor of early readmission. However, in the economics literature Finkelstein
et al. (2011) use the Medicaid lottery in Oregon to compare low income insured and
uninsured patients and find for the very poor that there is no difference in rates of
readmission between the two groups.
Gorodeski et al. (2010) study heart failure and suggests that readmissions may be
preventing mortality. While historically, readmissions have been viewed as a signal
of prior low quality care, Gorodeski et al. (2010) suggests that higher readmissions
may be a substitute for death, and thus associated with lower mortality.
In the economics literature, Bartel et al. (2014) and Carey (2014) also look at
the connection between readmissions and mortality by investigating longer hospital
stays versus outpatient interventions. Zhang et al. (2013) analyze the Hospital Read-
mission Reduction Program— part of the Affordable Care Act(ACA)— and using a
game theoretic approach show that competition between hospitals can both reduce
readmissions for some hospitals and increase the number of ‘worst offenders’ who
would rather pay a readmission penalty than reduce readmissions.
1.2.3 Mortality and Insurance Status
Much like the literature on demand, the literature on mortality and health in-
surance is sensitive to the type of analyses and populations examined. Looking at
working-age individuals, Kronick (2009) uses a Cox proportional survival analysis,
and when he controls for demographic characteristics, health status, and behaviors,
finds that there is no effect of insurance coverage on mortality for uninsured indi-
viduals. In the economics literature, Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) look at the
impact of the establishment of Medicare on mortality rates of the elderly and find
no discernible impact of insurance on mortality. Recently, Sommers et al. (2014)
capitalized on the quasi-experiment that occurred in Massachusetts when the state
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dramatically expanded health insurance coverage in 2006. They found no evidence of
a change in mortality for a 3 to 8 percentage-point increase in insurance rates.
There are however, a number of studies which do find that lack of insurance
increases the risk of mortality. Sommers et al. (2012) use a difference-in-difference
strategy and capitalize on the substantial expansion of Medicaid in New York, Maine,
and Arizona to quantify the effect of expanded coverage on mortality. They found that
expanding coverage by 2.2 percentage points decreased deaths by 19.6 per 100,000
adults, for a reduction of 6.1%. Wilper et al. (2009) used a survival analysis of non-
elderly adults and estimates that uninsured individuals are 1.4 times as likely to die
as their insured counterparts.
1.2.4 My Contribution
While the above literature has explored the questions of reduced services, rates
of readmission, and risk of mortality, this study links all three. More importantly, it
quantifies the disparities in demand for health services based on insurance status, and
investigates how those reductions in demand for uninsured patients influence health
outcomes.
Typically, there are three forces which reduce the demand of uninsured individuals
for medical care. First, they pay the entire bill — i.e. they have no co-insurance.
Second, the uninsured face much higher prices in a unregulated environment. Third,
providers may offer fewer services for fear of non-payment. Capitalizing on price
regulation in Maryland, this study is the first to isolate the patient-driven reductions
in quantity demanded for uninsured individuals who face the same prices as their
insured counterparts. One can conceptualize this as the effect of ‘paying the entire
bill’. Therefore, this paper provides insight into the level of service insured individuals
in an unregulated state would select if they were required to pay the whole bill, i.e.
for patients before they had hit their yearly deductible. Given that high-deductible
6
plans have blossomed in popularity under the Affordable Care Act, this paper provides
insight into pre-deductible consumption.
1.3 Maryland
1.3.1 Regulatory Framework
Maryland is often excluded from national health studies because of its unique
insurance structure. Maryland has a state commission, the Health Systems Cost Re-
view Commission (HSCRC), that regulates prices in the health care industry (Murray,
2009). The first type of regulation imposes prices on each type of service (called ‘rate
centers’), such as minutes in surgery, days in the ICU, etc. A patient’s bill then adds
up quantity times price in each rate center. For the purposes of illustration, suppose
that the only service a Maryland patient receives is time with a physician. If patient
j spends 20 minutes with a doctor and receives a bill of 100, patient k, who spent
40 minutes would receive a bill of 200. In most states, since prices are a function
of negotiated contracts, one cannot ‘back out’ from price an estimate of how much
care was received. If one looked at two bills of $100 and $200 which were not from
Maryland, a researcher would need to know which insurance (if any) the patients had,
about the market power of the insurance companies in the specific area, etc. Even
knowing these features, it would be very difficult to say with certainty the duration
of service the two patients had received. In Maryland, when comparing bills from the
same hospital, charges are directly tied to services received, and thus provide a good
measure of the quantity of services received.
Typically, Medicare sets its own rates and reimbursement structures for all hos-
pitals in the country. Upon occasion, a state is granted a wavier to the Medicare
reimbursement system to showcase a new approach to health care reimbursement.
The waivers provide the federal government a chance to determine on a small scale
the strengths and drawbacks of an alternative payment arrangement. Maryland has
a waiver that allows it to charge patients uniformly.
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1.3.2 Health Pricing in General and Health Pricing in Maryland
In a typical, non-waiver state, the Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements rates are
low. When considering Medicare nationally, in 2010 Medicare reimbursement is ap-
proximately 94.5 % of average costs and was projected to reach 93% by 2012 (MedPac,
2012). By comparison, uninsured individuals pay prices far above costs. According to
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, for the 100 most common Diagnosis-
Related Groups (DRGs), hospitals charged 3.77 times Medicare’s reimbursement rates
(Park, 2013). To compare charges to costs, then, we would observe Medicare paid
91.4 of costs in 2011 (Association(AHA), 2015). The ratio of charges to costs is then
3.77 ∗ .914 = 3.45. Thus, charges average 3.45 costs. Therefore in a non-regulated
state, we would expect uninsured individuals to face prices that are 3.45 times costs.
There is a great deal of variation from state to state in terms of how Medicaid is
implemented, but to get a sense Medicaid might pay 85 percent of average costs (As-
sociation(AHA), 2015), with charges again being approximately 3.45 times costs. We
think of many hospitals as having market power, and thus having the ability to set
prices. However, we can think of the current governmental reimbursement system
as creating a lower bound for a hospital’s private insurance rates for the hospital to
remain financially solvent. As a result, in a typical state, hospitals will look for sub-
stantial markups when they negotiate with private insurance companies. We can see
this in Figure 1, as governmental reimbursement rates drop, private insurance rates
increase (Association, 2015). Possibly, as government programs expand, the residual,
private-insurance, part of the market is made up of individuals with a lower price-
elasticity of demand. Hospitals are able to charge them higher prices, and insurance
rates rise accordingly.This relationship between governmental and private insurance
rates is one I observe in the data, and one I will explore in future work.
Market segmentation allows hospitals to price discriminate between privately-
insured, government-insured, and uninsured individuals. As hospitals have an obli-
gation to provide services to all patients in the emergency department, knowing that
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Fig. 1.1. Cost Shifting from American Hospital Association
uninsured individuals may have difficulty paying for some or all of the services pro-
vided, profit-maximizing hospitals may provide fewer services to uninsured individu-
als.
The payment structure in Maryland, however, eliminates both differential pricing
and concerns of non-payment. In Maryland, Medicare and Medicaid pay 94 percent
of charges, which, in 2008 were 1.22 times costs (Commission, 2008). This implies
Maryland hospitals are compensated above costs by government payers (1.22 ∗ .94 =
1.15), which is unusual. Compared to traditional states, hospitals in Maryland re-
ceive equal payment for uninsured, privately insured, or Medicare/Medicaid patients.
Maryland hospitals have no capacity to set rates (prices).1
In a non-waiver state, the gap between privately-insured and government payers is
large. The American Hospital Association graph in Figure 1 illustrates that currently,
this gap in the reimbursement rate is close to 40%. Additionally, since individuals
have no bargaining power, hospitals set prices for the uninsured at an average of
1For government payers there is, at most, a 6 percent difference between Medicare/ Medicaid and
non-Medicare/Medicaid patients. This doesn’t create an incentive to provide fewer services to gov-
ernment payers, however, because when a hospital’s base rate is established, the fraction of gov-
ernment patients is considered and built into the base rate. If a hospital serves more government
payers, its base rate increases the next year, if it serves fewer, it declines. As such, a hospital has no
financial incentive to provide a differential service mix to different payers. Details of how the base
rate is established can be found in Appendix A
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3.45 times costs, or nearly 2.5 times the rate for insured patients. Since rate-setting
is done at the state level in Maryland, all patients pay the same rates for services,
instead of the typical, less transparent system where some patients pay dramatically
more than others. One of the major contributions of this work is that by capitalizing
on the lack of incentives for hospitals to provide differential service to different payer
classes, I can quantify the patient-driven reductions in services for the uninsured and
the resulting health outcomes of those receiving reduced services.
1.3.3 Free Care and Bad Debt
One additional important feature of the rate-setting system in Maryland is the
Uncompensated Care pool, which encompasses both free care and bad debts. When
a hospital’s base rates are established, the average amount of free care and bad debt
provision—a little under 7%—is built into each hospital’s rates (HSCRC, 2013). At
the end of each year, hospitals reconcile their uncompensated care with the state
average. Hospitals which provided less uncompensated care than average pay into
the free care and bad debt pool. Hospitals which provided more such services than
average withdraw from the free care pool (HSCRC, 2013). In this way, hospitals do
not have an incentive to provide fewer services to uninsured individuals for fear that
they will not receive compensation for their services. From the point of view of the
hospital, the uncertainty over payment has been resolved and there is no financial
reason to provide a differential mix of services based on insurance status.
1.3.4 APRDRG: an illness severity measure
Patients are heterogeneous in the types and severity of their illnesses. As a re-
sult, when comparing demand for services across patient classes, we need to have
a measure of ‘how sick’ each patient is. 3M Health Information Systems developed
a classification system, which categorizes each patient into an All-Patient-Refined-
Diagnosis-Related-Group (APRDRG). This classification of patients is defined in two
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dimensions. A patient is categorized into a listing of diagnosis or procedure. This
initial categorization is the root Diagnosis Related Group (DRG). There are 314 root
DRGs in Maryland. Once the root DRG has been established, secondary diagno-
sis and other factors (obesity, other illnesses) are then considered and the patient
is assigned a severity class (1-4). For severity, the 1-4 scale runs from low to high.
The combination of the root DRG and the level of severity form the APRDRG (Sys-
tems, 2013). The APRDRG system is used in 30 states for payment or reporting.
APRDRGs are given weights according to their relative difficulty to treat. I will use
charges/APRDRG weight as a normalized measure of quantity of medical services
received and denote it by qN .
1.3.5 CMAD: a hospital volume of services
To measure the total volume of services a hospital provides, looking at charges–
per–patient would not be meaningful because of the heterogeneity in illness and sever-
ity. To deal with this issue, we use a standardized measure of the number of patients,
adjusted for type and severity of illness, treated at each hospital. This variable, the
Case Mix Adjusted Discharge (CMAD), is developed by the HSCRC. The construc-
tion of the CMAD is explained in Appendix B. Here I simply note that it can be
used as a measure of quantity of output that is normalized to be comparable across
hospitals.
1.3.6 Allowances
In Maryland, hospitals get an allowance for services per standard patient (APRDRG
weight of 1). This allowance is multiplied by the patient’s APRDRG weight to adjust
for illness heterogeneity. Therefore, if in a particular year a hospital sees more pa-
tients or more ill patients, their allowance reflects those changes. This allowance puts
financial pressure on the hospital to provide all necessary services, but not to ‘over
serve’ patients. In aggregate, a hospital is penalized if it charges above its allowance
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for the year. Typically a hospital is given 2% leeway, where if it is within 2% of total
charges, the hospital pays back the excess charges plus interest in the subsequent
year. For violations above 2%, it pays a penalty proportional to the overage.
1.3.7 Readmissions
In 2011, the HSCRC established a new policy to motivate hospitals to reduce
levels of readmitted patients. The idea was to create a clear financial incentive to co-
ordinate care so that patients would receive higher quality care initially and thereby
reduce readmissions. Prior to 2011, hospitals did not have a strong incentive to reduce
readmissions, as each time a patient returned to the hospital, they would have a new
APRDRG and add to the aggregate allowance for the hospital. In 2011, under the
Admission-Readmission Revenue (ARR) policy, for each readmission there was no
new allowance for treatment. Additionally, hospitals with high rates of readmission
got a reduced allowance per APRDRG the subsequent year, while hospitals that
reduced readmission got an increase to their allowance.
1.4 Who is Uninsured in Maryland?
1.4.1 Financially constrained
There are two primary reasons why individuals do not have health insurance:
an income constraint or a belief they don’t need insurance because they are young
and invincible.2 Insurance is costly, and prior to the health insurance exchanges set
2The second reason some individuals may chose to be uninsured is because they believe their private
health signal is very good and they don’t think they will get sick or injured, or that if they do, it will
be cheaper to pay out of pocket than to have insurance. One might be concerned that individuals
with good private health information may be healthier than average. However, in the data, I am only
looking at individuals who needed to stay at a hospital overnight. Even if one had a history of good
health, for there to be a presumption that there is a difference between the insured and uninsured,
one would need to believe that after the bad health shock I observe, the numerous categories for
classifying severity, risk of mortality, and other patient characteristics were insufficient controls. Put
12































Fig. 1.2. Distribution of all Uninsured in MD by Federal Poverty Level
up by the Affordable Care Act, individuals who were not offered insurance as part
of an employment package faced relatively high prices on the private market. The
logic behind high individual prices is that if an individual is seeking out individual
insurance that they are either very risk averse or have a bad private health signal.
Poor qualified individuals are eligible for Medicaid, but many low-income uninsured
individuals don’t qualify or make more than the Medicaid threshold.3 The histogram
in Figure 2 details who is uninsured in Maryland as a fraction of the Federal Poverty
level. Data is from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2013). In general, the uninsured
in Maryland are low-income individuals. Even in the top bracket, at 400+ percent of
the poverty level, families may be unable to afford insurance. In 2013, 400 percent of
another way, even if you have been very healthy, if you get acutely ill, would you be ‘less sick’ than
someone else who had similar characteristics?
I will run a number of specifications of my demand analysis to control for different patient char-
acteristics an potential selection effects. While ‘young invincibles’ are a documented phenomena
(Smith, 2014), the remainder of this analysis will focus on an income constraint as being the driving
motivation for remaining uninsured.
3To be eligible for Medicaid in Maryland, one must be over 65 years of age, disabled, blind, under
21, pregnant, or a parent of an unmarried child under 21.
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Fig. 1.3. Percent of Population Uninsured in MD by Federal Poverty Level
the poverty line would mean a family of 3 would make about $75,000. Prior to ACA,
premiums for a moderate policy for such a family could cost $750/month. $9,000
a year would constitute 12% of such a family’s pre-tax income. That may not be
affordable.
While Figure 2 looks at income distributions of those who are uninsured, it is
also informative to look at who is uninsured compared to the total population of
Maryland.
Data for Figure 3 is from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2013). We see in Figure
3 that more than 1 in 5 households that make less than 200 percent of the poverty line
are uninsured. At higher levels of family income, the probability of being uninsured
declines. Given that in the population, only 6% of individuals who make more than
4 times the poverty limit are uninsured, this data seems to support the story of an
income constraint. In the general population, most families or individuals who are
above 4 times the poverty line choose to be insured.
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1.4.2 Demand for Health Care in Maryland: Description
I think of the level of services received by a patient as the outcome of a bargain-
ing process involving physician, hospital, and patient.4 Descriptive statics for the
Maryland health care market confirm that uninsured individuals receive lower levels
of care.
One of the reasons people buy health insurance is that it reduces risk. Premium
payments each month lead to lower payments if services are required. After any
deductible has been met, individuals with insurance pay less out of pocket for services
than uninsured individuals.
As argued above, individuals who chose not to be insured do so either because of
a financial constraint or because they anticipate a low probability that they will need
health care services. Therefore, when uninsured individuals have a bad health shock
and require overnight hospitalization, they are likely to be more sensitive to prices
than insured individuals, since they pay the full price of services. They should thus
demand fewer services, all else equal.5
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Identification
I report below the results of econometric analyses of normalized level of services
received, readmission rates, and mortality rates for patients under age 65. My strategy
4For an explicit model of the determination of the equilibrium level of services received, see Cook
and Martin (2015).
5In 2005, Maryland created legislation that required hospitals to provide financial assistance for
low income individuals (HSCRC, 2015). There is a voluntary guideline that hospitals should, at a
minimum, provide free care to those below 150% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). In 2009, 15
hospitals used this standard and 23 used a higher level of income, ranging from 175% to 300% of
the FPL, with 200% being the mode (HSCRC, 2009). If patients are aware of these aid programs,
we might expect individuals living in poorer zip codes to be less price sensitive, since they know
they will not have to pay their bills. We then might expect low-income uninsured individuals to
receive more care, and high-income uninsured individuals to receive less care. However, while these
financial aid programs exist, finding information on them outside of Commission documentation is
quite challenging and it seems unlikely they were common knowledge. While the data will speak to
this, my working assumption is that uninsured individuals face a ‘higher’ price than the insured.
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for identification is as follows. I am conceptualizing this as a two-period model. In
this first period, individuals choose if they would like to purchase insurance, either
through their employer or non-group insurance on the private market. They can also
choose to remain uninsured.
In the second period, after the insurance decision has been made, some individuals
experience a bad health shock and are admitted to the hospital. Thus, at the time of
admission, insurance status is exogenous.
One might have concerns that there are covariates that are correlated with the
choice to purchase insurance in the first period. The response to this concern is two
fold. First, there are a great number of demographic controls—sex, race, ethnicity,
marital status, age category, zip code of residence—which are explicitly controlled
for in my empirical work. So while young, white, married men are more likely to be
uninsured, each of those characteristics is used as a control in my regressions, and
therefore the effect of being uninsured is disentangled from characteristics.
Second, one might be concerned about a patient having private health informa-
tion and that influencing their decision to purchase insurance. For example, if a
patient is sicker, they may opt to purchase insurance. While this certainly occurs it
is not a threat to identification for two reasons. My measure of services examines
normalized charges. Normalized charges represent the number of services a patient
would receive if they had an ‘average’ illness. It is scaled by ‘illness level’(APRDRG
weight). Therefore, sicker patients—as determined by their APRDRG weight— have
their charges scaled down, and less ill patients have their charges scaled up, so I can
compare average patients with a APRDRG weight of 1.
The second reason private information is not a threat to identification is that a
patient’s knowledge of potential illness might increase the probability that they would
seek out care, but given that my data is conditional on admission, I am only looking
at patients who were sick enough to seek out treatment. The services provided by the
hospital are a function of the current bad health shock and the associated diagnoses.
They are uncorrelated with prior beliefs about health.
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Additionally, to address the concern that uninsured individual may be less likely
to go to the hospital when ill, I exclude patients who are only admitted for one
night. Thus excluding ‘marginal’ admissions. However, even if I did not exclude these
patients staying for only one night, there would not be a threat to identification. My
evaluation of services looks at charges normalized by level of illness. As such, very
ill patients receive proportionally more services. While one still may be concerned
that less ill uninsured patients select not to go to the hospital, this would not bias
my results. The reason for this is that the level of illness(APRDRG weight) is not
economically predictive of normalized charges, qN =
total chg
APRDRGweight
. 6It is not the
case that less sick patients receive fewer normalized charges, so even if the ‘marginal’
uninsured selected not to go to the hospital, and removing the patients who stay
for one night did not seem like a sufficient adjustment, patient illness level is not
predictive of normalized charges. So there is not a threat to identification from
selection of uninsured not to go to the hospital.
1.5.2 Level of Services
Regression
To determine if payer class has an effect on service volume, I run a regression
on total charges per APRDRG weight with control variables would help correct for
observable characteristics. I use the following specification:




, P is a vector of patient characteristics including sex, race,
ethnicity, martial status, average income by zip code, and age category and H is a
6APRDRG weight predicts an increase of about 25 dollars of increased charges for every one unit
increase of APRDRG weight. The mean and standard deviation of APRDRG weight are both about
1, so a one unit change in weight is very substantial. The $25 increase in charges is econometricaly
significant, but not economically so.
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vector of hospital variables including hospital dummies, severity, mortality. Results
are found in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1.
Charges/ Weight by Payer Class
(1)
Charges per weight (CPW)
Medicare -107.1∗∗ (34.01)
Blue Cross -609.2∗∗∗ (39.62)
Non-Group Ins. -629.7∗∗∗ (35.42)
Workmen’s Comp -173.5 (108.4)
Uninsured -1561.3∗∗∗ (40.84)







Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
There is relatively little variation among insured individuals. Looking at column
1, charges per weight, we observe that Medicaid patients, the comparison group,
use more services for adjusted illness than any other group—all the coefficients on
payer classes are negative. Blue Cross and non-group insurance both use about $600
fewer services than Medicaid patients, which given average charges per weight of
$13,075 is a 4.6% reduction in services. The reduction in services for uninsured
individuals—$1561, is 2.6 times bigger than of Blue Cross and non-group insurance
and is estimated as approximately 12% reduction in services. The type of insurance
is far less important to predict services per weight than whether a patient has any
insurance or no insurance. As such, the remainder of this paper will combine all
insured individuals —both government payers and private— to create an ‘insured’
dummy variable.
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In the United States, if one works for 10 years, s/he becomes eligible for Medicare.
As a result, individuals who are over 65 and remain uninsured likely are different from
their insured counterparts. The remainder of this paper will focus on individuals
under 65.
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Patients Under 65 Years of Age
Patients who are uninsured may be different from those who are insured. Sta-
tistically, the uninsured are working, male, in a family, younger, and earn less in-
come than their insured counterparts. In order to explicitly separate the effects of
differences in characteristics and differences in insurance status, I employ a Blinder
Oaxaca Decomposition to determine the effect of being uninsured on services received
per APRDRG weight. I have grouped all insured payer classes together to create an
insured/uninsured dummy variable. The specification is then
qN = β0 + Pβ1 + payer classβ2 +Hβ3 + yearβ4 + ε, (1.2)
where P is a vector of patient characteristics including sex, race, ethnicity, martial
status, average income by zip code, average income interacted with insurance, age
category and H is a vector of hospital variables including a hospital dummy, severity,
mortality.
To interpret the results in Table 1.2, note that uninsured individuals (Prediction 1)
receive an average qN of $11,699 while insured individuals receive $13188.1. The dif-
ference in the average charges per weight is $1489.2. We decompose this difference
into three components: the difference in observables, the difference in coefficients, and
an interaction term, which recognizes that differences in endowments and coefficients
exist simultaneously.
From the Blinder Oaxaca decomposition, we can see that, on average, uninsured
individuals receive about 11.3% fewer services than their insured counterparts. The
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Table 1.2.




Prediction 1 11699.0∗∗∗ (28.65)







Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition breaks down this difference into three components.
The first is the ‘Endowment’ effect. It measures the difference in predictors between
the insured and uninsured groups. Therefore, about 2 percentage points7 of the
difference ( $−274
13188.1
) can be attributed to uninsured individuals having ‘healthier’ char-
acteristics. While this suggests that uninsured and insured individuals have slightly
different characteristics, these differences in observables are a small part of the overall
difference between the two groups.
The differences in coefficients, however, is much larger in magnitude. The ‘Coeffi-
cients’ term measures the expected change in treatment if an insured individual had
coefficients of an uninsured individual. About 8.4 percentage points8 of the difference
(−$1103.94
13188.1
) in service levels between insured and uninsured individuals is attributed to
coefficients. We can think of this as the effect in treatment of being uninsured.9
Finally, the interaction term captures the simultaneous differences between en-
dowments and coefficients. It represents 1% ( −138
131881.1
) of the differences in treatment
levels.
Blinder Oaxaca: Dummy for Illnesses with High and Low Risk of Mortality
To better understand differences in demand, I now turn my attention to illnesses
which have a high risk of mortality. Uninsured individuals are much more likely
than their insured counterparts to die of a handful of diseases. These include: tra-
cheostomy, liver disease, stroke, respiratory failure, pulmonary embolism, lung and
colon cancer, heart attacks and pneumonia. To determine what effect these diseases
have on different rates of mortality, I created a dummy variable for the 13 APRDRGs.
One might imagine that if faced with a high risk of death, that a patient would be less
price sensitive than if they had a low risk of mortality. As such, I expect demand for
7or 16.6%
8or about 75%
9Propensity score matching was also employed. The effect was about a 5.1% reduction in services
for the uninsured.
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services to be similar for insured and uninsured individuals when they have illnesses
which have a high risk of mortality and larger differences in services for diseases with
low mortality. I run the following specification twice, once for high risk illnesses once
for low risk illnesses.
qN = β0 + Pβ1 + payer classβ2 +Hβ3 + yearβ4 + ε (1.3)
P is a vector of patient characteristics including sex, race, ethnicity, martial status,
average income by zip code, average income interacted with insurance, age category
and H is a vector of hospital variables including a hospital dummy, severity, mortality.
Results can be seen in Table 1.3
Table 1.3.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition by Insurance with High and Low Risk Illnesses
(1) (2)
high risk low risk
Differential
Prediction 1 13353.3∗∗∗ (174.3) 11618.7∗∗∗ (28.69)
Prediction 2 14131.0∗∗∗ (61.55) 13154.3∗∗∗ (10.88)
Difference -777.7∗∗∗ (184.1) -1535.6∗∗∗ (30.55)
Decomposition
Endowments -783.1∗∗∗ (90.51) -238.6∗∗∗ (15.29)
Coefficients 320.6 (435.0) -1135.9∗∗∗ (60.45)
Interaction -315.2 (388.7) -161.1∗∗ (52.03)
Observations 41674 1130721
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In Table 1.3, column 1 shows the coefficients for the Blinder Oaxaca decomposi-
tion for individuals who have a diagnosis related group with a high risk of mortality.
We see that insured individuals (Prediction 2) receive $14,131 of charges per average
patient. Uninsured individuals (Prediction 1), receive $777.70 fewer services per aver-
age patient. However, this difference is attributable to differences in endowments, i.e.
the insured have ‘worse’ health characteristics and is not attributable to insurance
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status. What this suggests is that when faced with death, there is no difference in
service provision based on insurance status.
This is not the case in column 2, which show coefficients for patients who have
a low risk of mortality. Here we see insured patients (Prediction 2) receive $1535.6
more services than uninsured patients, but for these low risk DRGs the vast majority
of the difference $1136 is attributable to being uninsured. The $1136 represents the
reduction in services an insured person would receive if his insurance status were
changed to uninsured.
Blinder Oaxaca by Average Income Quantiles
To assess if income is the driving force for differences in patient-driven differences
in services, I run a separate Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for each of the eight
average income quantiles to determine if patient-driven demand varies by the average
income of their residential zip code.
qN = β0 + Pβ1 + payer classβ2 +Hβ3 + yearβ4 + ε (1.4)
P is a vector of patient characteristics including sex, race, ethnicity, martial status,
average income by zip code, average income interacted with insurance, age category
and H is a vector of hospital variables including a hospital dummy, severity, mortality.
This regression was run eight separate times, each time taking data from one of
the eight average income quantiles. Results for quantiles 1 through 4 were recorded
in Table 1.4 and results for quantiles 5 through 8 were recorded in Table 1.5.
As one might expect, as income rises, the gap between Insured (Prediction˙2) and
Uninsured (Prediction 1) decreases dramatically as we look from Quantile 1 (column
1 in Table 1.5) to Quantile 8 (Column 4 in Table 1.6). In Quantile 1, individuals
who live in the bottom 1
8
of average income by zip code receive $2619.9 fewer services
than their insured counterparts. In Quantile 8, individuals who live in the top 1
8
of average income by zip code, that gap drops to $851.9 fewer services than their
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Table 1.4.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition by Insurance and Ave. Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4
Differential
Prediction 1 11937.8∗∗∗ (63.95) 11840.6∗∗∗ (72.31) 11742.3∗∗∗ (74.19) 11684.5∗∗∗ (78.01)
Prediction 2 14557.7∗∗∗ (32.12) 13669.0∗∗∗ (30.05) 13593.4∗∗∗ (31.87) 13130.8∗∗∗ (29.04)
Difference -2619.9∗∗∗ (71.18) -1828.3∗∗∗ (77.99) -1851.1∗∗∗ (80.29) -1446.3∗∗∗ (82.91)
Decomposition
Endowments -856.4∗∗∗ (39.64) -507.2∗∗∗ (39.75) -238.3∗∗∗ (42.28) -306.0∗∗∗ (41.41)
Coefficients -2001.9∗∗∗ (138.7) -1142.6∗∗∗ (160.6) -1468.6∗∗∗ (151.8) -969.3∗∗∗ (160.0)
Interaction 238.4 (122.0) -178.6 (140.8) -144.3 (127.7) -171.0 (137.8)
Observations 164434 155520 140085 152137
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.5.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition by Insurance and Ave. Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 11554.3∗∗∗ (85.42) 11575.7∗∗∗ (93.06) 11474.0∗∗∗ (93.84) 11520.9∗∗∗ (100.5)
Prediction 2 12685.7∗∗∗ (29.11) 12612.0∗∗∗ (28.58) 12673.5∗∗∗ (28.72) 12372.8∗∗∗ (29.75)
Difference -1131.4∗∗∗ (89.93) -1036.2∗∗∗ (97.12) -1199.5∗∗∗ (97.94) -851.9∗∗∗ (104.6)
Decomposition
Endowments -181.4∗∗∗ (39.76) -172.9∗∗∗ (46.79) -216.0∗∗∗ (45.00) -249.5∗∗∗ (48.18)
Coefficients -968.6∗∗∗ (163.2) -774.9∗∗∗ (188.1) -392.3∗ (198.0) -833.6∗∗∗ (153.6)
Interaction 18.62 (140.0) -88.43 (167.2) -591.2∗∗∗ (178.7) 231.2 (133.8)
Observations 135367 151842 136466 136544
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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insured counterparts. These numbers account for both differences in endowments
and differences associated with being uninsured. The ‘Coefficients’ term tells us how
many fewer services an insured person would receive if they were uninsured. We
see significant and substantial changes in the effect of being uninsured as one moves
up the income quantiles. For the individuals in quantile 1, an insured person who
‘switched’ to being uninsured would receive $2002 fewer services. In the top quantile,
this difference drops to $834 fewer services per average patient. This suggests that
income is playing a significant role in patients’ demand for services. Patients with
lower incomes are more sensitive to price, and as a result, uninsured patients in the
bottom quantile of average income demand a smaller quantity of services than both
their wealthier uninsured and low-income insured counterparts. To further explore
this question of an income constraint, I now examine an interaction of the high and
low risk of mortality dummy with income quantiles.
Blinder Oaxaca by Average Income Quantiles with High/Low Risk Inter-
actions
Next, I examine how average income by zip code and high and low risk of mortality
work together. Using the same specification
qN = β0 + Pβ1 + payer classβ2 +Hβ3 + yearβ4 + ε, (1.5)
I cut the data both by income quantile and high/ low risk. As such there are 16
separate regressions. Results for the low risk diagnoses and all income quantiles can
be found in Tables 6 & 7. High risk across all quantiles is in Tables 8 & 9.
For individuals with diagnoses with low risk of mortality, we observe that the
effect of being uninsured (Coefficients) varies by income and is largest for individuals
who live in the bottom quantile of average income by zip code at just over $2050 fewer
dollars of treatment. The amount of service reduction for uninsured patients is fairly
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Table 1.6.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(1-4) and Low Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4
Differential
Prediction 1 11884.8∗∗∗ (64.47) 11792.4∗∗∗ (73.12) 11685.6∗∗∗ (74.80) 11577.8∗∗∗ (77.32)
Prediction 2 14541.9∗∗∗ (32.66) 13654.4∗∗∗ (30.54) 13554.6∗∗∗ (32.09) 13101.6∗∗∗ (29.21)
Difference -2657.1∗∗∗ (71.87) -1862.0∗∗∗ (78.93) -1869.0∗∗∗ (80.95) -1523.8∗∗∗ (82.35)
Decomposition
Endowments -839.9∗∗∗ (40.66) -489.6∗∗∗ (40.68) -219.2∗∗∗ (43.07) -314.4∗∗∗ (42.15)
Coefficients -2054.2∗∗∗ (139.7) -1186.0∗∗∗ (161.8) -1444.9∗∗∗ (155.7) -915.2∗∗∗ (159.8)
Interaction 237.0 (123.3) -186.4 (141.4) -204.9 (131.8) -294.3∗ (139.6)
Observations 158190 149328 134923 146563
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.7.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(5-8) and Low Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 11445.7∗∗∗ (85.79) 11483.3∗∗∗ (91.90) 11396.8∗∗∗ (95.13) 11378.8∗∗∗ (99.43)
Prediction 2 12644.1∗∗∗ (29.36) 12574.7∗∗∗ (28.49) 12640.7∗∗∗ (28.83) 12323.2∗∗∗ (29.71)
Difference -1198.4∗∗∗ (90.39) -1091.4∗∗∗ (96.00) -1243.9∗∗∗ (99.21) -944.3∗∗∗ (103.6)
Decomposition
Endowments -191.5∗∗∗ (40.37) -182.4∗∗∗ (47.30) -228.7∗∗∗ (45.14) -281.0∗∗∗ (47.27)
Coefficients -991.2∗∗∗ (170.0) -969.2∗∗∗ (153.2) -411.9∗ (206.3) -912.5∗∗∗ (157.3)
Interaction -15.75 (146.2) 60.27 (136.0) -603.3∗∗ (187.7) 249.2 (139.3)
Observations 130593 147253 131791 132080
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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constant for quantiles 4 through 8 at about $900.10 Again, I observe that when faced
with uniform prices, patients living in low income zip codes demand fewer services.
Table 1.8.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(1-4) and High Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4
Differential
Prediction 1 13334.1∗∗∗ (391.7) 12731.2∗∗∗ (386.6) 12999.6∗∗∗ (397.5) 13888.6∗∗∗ (527.3)
Prediction 2 14955.9∗∗∗ (142.8) 14029.6∗∗∗ (132.1) 14626.6∗∗∗ (183.4) 13917.0∗∗∗ (177.2)
Difference -1621.8∗∗∗ (416.6) -1298.4∗∗ (408.2) -1627.0∗∗∗ (435.0) -28.42 (551.0)
Decomposition
Endowments -1614.6∗∗∗ (174.0) -1186.9∗∗∗ (162.6) -1138.7∗∗∗ (256.3) -474.7 (270.0)
Coefficients -36.33 (1433.2) -72.29 (596.4) -906.5 (584.1) 987.1∗ (437.0)
Interaction 29.21 (1338.7) -39.19 (589.6) 418.2 (503.9) -540.9 (398.9)
Observations 6244 6192 5162 5574
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.9.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(5-8) and High Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 13704.1∗∗∗ (462.6) 13423.2∗∗∗ (653.8) 12817.9∗∗∗ (446.3) 14229.6∗∗∗ (657.8)
Prediction 2 13859.7∗∗∗ (164.2) 13856.9∗∗∗ (231.0) 13638.0∗∗∗ (172.5) 13893.8∗∗∗ (196.1)
Difference -155.6 (490.7) -433.7 (688.5) -820.1 (477.4) 335.8 (684.6)
Decomposition
Endowments -228.3 (247.3) -330.6 (432.9) -204.8 (312.6) -78.11 (415.0)
Coefficients 78.29 (529.3) 2719.4 (1787.4) -409.8 (513.4) 229.8 (559.2)
Interaction -5.539 (473.9) -2822.4 (1616.5) -205.5 (366.0) 184.1 (561.9)
Observations 4774 4589 4675 4464
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
For individuals with a high risk of mortality, for all but one quantile, there is no
reduction in services attributable to insurance status. For quantile 4, the aggregate
difference for insured and uninsured is small, and the effect of being uninsured is
to receive more services.11 This suggests that when faced with death, patients elect
10Notice quantile 7 has a smaller reduction (-411.9) but has a large standard error (206.3) and has a
large interactions term, meaning a fair amount of the variation in charges couldn’t be disentangled
between endowments and insurance status.
11This result is no longer significant if two high charge-per-weight uninsured outliers are removed.
There are 573 uninsured individuals in quantile 4 of income with illnesses that put them at a high
risk of mortality.
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to receive the same amount of service, regardless of insurance status. Assuming
that Maryland hospitals are optimally providing both the right type and quantity
of service, an assumption that seems reasonable given that hospitals have financial
pressure not to over serve and also prevent readmissions, this suggests all patients
receive optimal service provision levels when faced with death.12
1.5.3 Readmission
Readmission Rates for Patients Under 65 Years of Age
Blinder-Oaxaca estimates uninsured patients receive 8% fewer services than their
insured counterparts, and that these differences are magnified for a few categories of
patients: low income, low-risk of mortality, and black patients (or any combination of
those groups). The next two sections investigate the link between uninsured patients
receiving fewer services and worse health outcomes in the form of higher rates of
readmission or higher rates of mortality.
In Maryland, readmission is defined as a patient returning to the hospital within
thirty days of an initial admission. I am interested in the link between a reduction
in services for uninsured patients and an increase in subsequent readmission rates to
the hospital. In order to get at this, I look at initial patient records and determine
if there was a subsequent readmission. For visits where there was a subsequent visit,
the initial visit was identified as a ‘readmit later’. This is the variable of interest in
this section.13
12I have also run Blinder Oaxaca with Average Income, High/Low Risk, and a Black White Race
Dummy. Results follow a similar pattern to the results with high/low risk and income quantiles,
however, the differences in service level is between insured and uninsured individuals is larger for
Blacks than Whites. Full regressions results can be found in Appendix E and F.
13For robustness, the regressions for readmissions were also run using the readmission—as opposed
to the first visit which had a subsequent readmission— results are nearly identical. However, by
looking only at initial admissions, every visit has the opportunity to become a readmission.
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Below there is the first specification for the logistic regression on readmission.
logit(readmission) = β0 + uninsuredβuninsur. + Pβp
+Hβhosp + yearβyr + ε
(1.6)
Here P is matrix of patient characteristics: age category, race, average income
by zip code, marital status, sex, and H is a matrix of patient characteristics at the
hospital: ID, APRDRG, severity, mortality.
Results are reported in Table 1.10 as an odds ratio.
Table 1.10.












Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In Table 1.10, we see uninsured individuals are 71.9% as likely to be readmitted
as their insured counterparts. We see that black patients are 3.7% percent less likely
to be readmitted than whites, and that married individuals are readmitted a bit
under 10% less than single patients, while separated, divorced, or widowed patients
are readmitted over 10% more than single patients. In the next specification, we will
examine if readmission rates vary with diagnoses with high and low risk of mortality.
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Readmissions with Uninsured and High and Low Risk of Mortality Dummy
We saw in section 5.1.3 that uninsured individuals who faced a high risk of death
received the same level of service as insured patients, whereas uninsured individuals
who had a low risk of mortality received fewer services than their insured counterparts.
In this section, we investigate if there is a difference in readmission rates for these
same groups of patients using the following specification.
logit(readmission) = β0 + uninsured ∗ high riskβunhig.
+uninsured ∗ low riskβunlow. + insured ∗ high riskβinhigh.
+Pβp +Hβhosp + yearβyr + ε
(1.7)
Where P is matrix of patient characteristics: age category, race, average income
by zip code, marital status, sex, and H is a matrix of patient characteristics at the
hospital: ID, APRDRG, severity, mortality. Results can be found in Table 1.11.
Table 1.11.




Insured highrisk 1.260 (0.261)
Uninsured lowrisk 0.717∗∗∗ (0.0126)
Uninsured highrisk 0.941 (0.203)
Ave Income 1.000 (0.000000323)
Observations 1089602
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In Table 1.11, the comparison group for the odds ratios found is insured low-
risk individuals. We can see that insured high-risk individuals and insured low-risk
individuals have the same rates of readmission. When faced with death, uninsured
individuals return to the hospital and receive equivalent services.
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However, uninsured low-risk individuals are much less likely to be readmitted than
insured low risk individuals. Recall from section 5.1.3, that uninsured low-risk indi-
viduals received 11.7% fewer services than their insured counterparts and nearly 75%
of that difference is not attributable to characteristics (8.6%). This suggests that the
reduction in services that affects uninsured low-risk individuals does not translate
into a bad health outcome, namely higher rates of readmission. This reduction in
readmissions for low-risk illnesses is consistent with a patient-driven reduction in de-
mand for services among the uninsured. Uninsured individuals, facing responsibility
for the entire bill, demand less service and that includes returning to the hospital.
Readmission Rates by Income Quantiles
In the next specification, I allow the effect of my income proxy, average income
by zip code, to assume a nonlinear form by diving average income into 8 quantiles.
logit(readmission) = β0 + Unins. ∗ Inc. Quantilesβuninc.
+Pβp +Hβhosp + yearβyr + ε
(1.8)
Here P is matrix of patient characteristics: age category, race, average income
by zip code, marital status, sex, and H is a matrix of patient characteristics at the
hospital: ID, APRDRG, severity, mortality. Results can be found in Table 1.12
As we see in Table 1.12, the uninsured individuals are less likely than their insured
counterparts to be readmitted to the hospital. Uninsured individuals living in the
poorest quantile, are 62.5% as likely to be readmitted as their insured counterparts.14
A discussion of insured and uninsured individuals is facilitated by coefficient plots.
14Also notice that readmission rates vary by marital status. Married individuals are 2% less likely
than single individuals to be readmitted. Separated individuals are 13% more likely than single
individuals to be readmitted. One might attribute this to worse health as the result of the stress of









Insured income2 0.979 (0.0175)
Insured income3 0.982 (0.0187)
Insured income4 1.020 (0.0204)
Insured income5 0.988 (0.0203)
Insured income6 0.960∗ (0.0197)
Insured income7 0.975 (0.0206)
Insured income8 0.936∗∗ (0.0207)
Uninsured income2 1.119∗ (0.0642)
Uninsured income3 1.052 (0.0620)
Uninsured income4 1.137∗ (0.0670)
Uninsured income5 1.309∗∗∗ (0.0788)
Uninsured income6 1.265∗∗∗ (0.0810)
Uninsured income7 1.220∗∗ (0.0780)
Uninsured income8 1.344∗∗∗ (0.0894)
Observations 1089602
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Fig. 1.4. Readmission Rates for Insured Individuals Under 65
In Figure 4, the basis for comparison is insured individuals who live in the poorest
(1st quantile) zip codes. Observe that there is almost no variation in readmission
rates for insured individuals in all quantiles of average income by zip code. The
exception is the top income quantile, which has a statistically significant lower rate
of readmission, at 6.4% less likely. This effect is reasonably small in magnitude and
one might imagine the decline in readmission to be attributed to a wealth effect.
Individuals who are quite wealthy may hire home care and recover better from initial
admissions, may be better able to take time off from work to recover from their initial
admission, and may have access to better food, additional treatments, etc.
When we compare these readmission rates to levels of service, we do not find
a similar pattern. Insured individuals in the highest quantile do not receive more
services. For insured individuals, there does not seem to be a link between service
provision and readmission rates.
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Fig. 1.5. Readmission Rates for Uninsured Individuals Under 65
Figure 5 plots coefficients from Table 1.12 for uninsured individuals interacted
with average income by quantile. We see a substantial increase in readmission rates
for uninsured individuals in the top half of average income by zip codes compared
to those uninsured individuals in the bottom eighth. In quantiles 5, 6, 7, and 8, we
see a 22 to 34% increase in readmission rates. Income appears to be a substantial
factor in an uninsured person being readmitted. One could explain this result with an
income-constraint argument. Uninsured individuals who live in wealthier zip codes
are more likely to have more money and thus are more likely to return to the hospital
when they are ill for additional treatment compared to their poor counterparts.
Comparing the uninsured individuals living in the top quantile of average income
to insured individuals in the same segment, one would look at the product of the odds
ratios. In this case, .625 ∗ 1.344 = .84. The uninsured individuals living in the top
quantile of income, who are the most likely among the uninsured to be readmitted are
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still only 84% as likely to readmitted as insured individuals in the bottom quantile of
average income.15
When we consider these readmission rates in conjunction with service levels from
Section 5.1.4, again we find limited evidence of reduced services translating into poor
health outcomes. Uninsured individuals from the bottom quantile received the fewest
services compared to their insured counterparts, but were the least likely to be read-
mitted. If low provision of services were causing poor health outcomes, one would
expect uninsured individuals in the bottom quantile to be the most likely to be read-
mitted. Similarly, uninsured individuals in the top half of average income by zip
code have much higher rates of readmission, but have closer service provision to their
insured counterparts. Based on their levels of service, we would expect uninsured
individuals in the top half of the average income distribution to have the lowest rates
of readmission, not the highest.16
These findings are consistent with a patient-driven reduction in demand story.
The uninsured from the lowest average income zip codes prefer fewer services at the
given price. As the proxy for income rises, the uninsured demand more services.
Uninsured patients in the bottom quantile of income receive both the fewest services
in initial admissions and are much less likely to be readmitted. They demand fewer
services, very possibly because of income constraints. As one looks looks at progres-
sively wealthier zip codes of residence, I observe that the level of service from initial
admissions rises—although not to the same level as the insured— and the rates of
readmission rise as well. As the income constraint is relaxed, uninsured patients de-
mand more services. For insured patients, who are responsible for a fraction of the
bill—their coinsurance rate— we see nearly identical rates of readmission across all
15In comparing length of stay in the hospital and time between visits, there was no significant
difference among privately insured, Medicaid and uninsured individuals. Uninsured individuals are
neither staying in the hospital less time nor postponing care.
16I have also investigated if un/insured individuals have differences in their length of stay at a
hospital or if the time between readmissions varies. Neither length of stay nor time between visits
explains the difference in patterns of readmission, but a full discussion can be found in the Appendix
in section A.8.
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income quantiles. When services are less costly, as to a patient with insurance, the
optimal level of readmission is unrelated to income.
Readmission Rates by Income Quantiles and High/ Low Risk of Mortality
Dummy
In the next specification, I examine the interaction between risk of mortality (high
and low) and 8 income quantiles. I use the following specification:
logit(readmission) = UninsuredβUninsured + Unins Low ∗ Income Quantilesβunlow
+Unins High ∗ Income Quantilesβunhigh + Ins High ∗ Income Quantilesβinhigh
+Income Quantilesβinc + Pβp +Hβhosp + yearβyr + ε.
(1.9)
Here P is matrix of patient characteristics: age category, race, average income
by zip code, marital status, sex, and H is a matrix of patient characteristics at the
hospital: ID, APRDRG, severity, mortality. Results can be found in Table 1.13.
Note that the comparison group for Table 1.13 is low-risk insured individuals who
are in the bottom quantile of income. Again, in the bottom quantile of income, we
see no difference in readmission between insured individuals with a low or high risk of
mortality. Uninsured high-risk individuals residing in the bottom 1
8
of average income
by zip code get readmitted at the same rate as their insured counterparts. However,
uninsured low-risk individuals living in the bottom quantile of average income have
much lower rates of readmission, at only 62% of their insured counterparts.
Insured and uninsured individuals with a high risk of mortality all are readmitted
at the same rates, and at nearly identical rates to insured low-risk individuals. The
exception is the slightly lower rates of readmission among the ‘high-income’ low-risk
insured group, with 6% reduction in readmission.
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Table 1.13.




Insured highrisk 1.292 (0.273)
Uninsured lowrisk 0.621∗∗∗ (0.0253)
Uninsured highrisk 0.903 (0.233)
Ins low income2 0.976 (0.0179)
Ins low income3 0.981 (0.0191)
Ins low income4 1.025 (0.0209)
Ins low income5 0.986 (0.0208)
Ins low income6 0.963 (0.0202)
Ins low income7 0.981 (0.0211)
Ins low income8 0.941∗∗ (0.0213)
ins high income2 1.048 (0.0675)
ins high income3 1.020 (0.0717)
ins high income4 0.928 (0.0644)
ins high income5 1.030 (0.0727)
ins high income6 0.942 (0.0685)
ins high income7 0.899 (0.0654)
ins high income8 0.911 (0.0681)
Unin low income2 1.129∗ (0.0666)
Unin low income3 1.059 (0.0641)
Unin low income4 1.147∗ (0.0694)
Unin low income5 1.298∗∗∗ (0.0810)
Unin low income6 1.260∗∗∗ (0.0836)
Unin low income7 1.229∗∗ (0.0810)
Unin low income8 1.366∗∗∗ (0.0932)
Unin high income2 1.005 (0.216)
Unin high income3 0.946 (0.218)
Unin high income4 0.900 (0.209)
Unin high income5 1.438 (0.312)
Unin high income6 1.239 (0.283)
Unin high income7 0.976 (0.228)
Unin high income8 0.942 (0.245)
Observations 1089602
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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The uninsured low-risk individuals show a fair amount of variation in their read-
mission rates, with much higher readmission rates in the top half of average income.
However, uninsured low-risk individuals in the top quantile of average income still
receive fewer services than all insured patients. Multiplying the two coefficients for
‘uninsured’ and ‘uninsured˙income8’, I find even the most likely uninsured low-risk
individuals are only 84.8% as likely to be readmitted as an insured patient.17
Again, there is no link between a reduction in service and an increase in readmis-
sion rates and a fairly strong link between uninsured patients’ reduction in demand
for services and readmission for low risk illnesses. For high risk illnesses, all patients
have equivalent rates of both services and readmission.18 Next, I will investigate if
there is a relationship between a reduction in service and increased rates of mortality.
1.5.4 Mortality
Mortality Rates for Patients Under 65
After examining the question of how readmission rates are affected by insurance
status, I now turn to another measure of health, mortality. This next section addresses
how insurance status for those under 65 years of age changes a patient’s likelihood of
death.
Table 1.14 contains the results of the following regression:
logit(death) = β0 + Pβp + insurance dummyβins + Average Income by Zipβaibz
+Hβhosp + yearβyr + ε.
(1.10)
17.621x1.366 is .848
18I have also done this analysis using the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Inpatient
Quality Indicators and have found similar results. Please see the Appendix in section A.7 for a
complete discussion.
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Here P is matrix of patient characteristics: age category, race, average income
by zip code, marital status, sex, and H is a matrix of patient characteristics at the
hospital: ID, APRDRG, severity, mortality.
Table 1.14.









Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Here we can see that overall, uninsured individuals are 23% more likely to die
than their insured counterparts. I next investigate if there is a differential rate of
mortality for uninsured individuals with a high and low risk of mortality.
Mortality Rates by High/ Low Risk
To investigate which uninsured patients are experiencing high rates of mortality,
I interact an uninsured dummy with a high/ low risk of mortality dummy using the
following specification:
logit(death) = β0 + uninsured ∗ high riskβunhig.
+uninsured ∗ low riskβunlow.
+insured ∗ high riskβinhigh.
+Pβp +Hβhosp + yearβyr + ε
(1.11)
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P is matrix of patient characteristics: age category, race, average income by zip
code, marital status, sex, and H is a matrix of patient characteristics at the hospital:
ID, APRDRG, severity, mortality. Results can be found in Table 1.15.
Table 1.15.




Iuninhigh 1 14.13∗∗∗ (5.125)
Iuninhigh 10 1.123∗ (0.0645)
Iuninhigh 11 22.11∗∗∗ (8.242)
Ave Income 1.000 (0.000000930)
Observations 1103074
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the comparison group in Table 1.15 is insured, low risk of mortality
patients. When we compare insured low-risk patients to uninsured low-risk patients,
we see that the uninsured have a 12.3% increase in their rate of mortality. We see
sizable coefficients for both the high-risk uninsured and high-risk insured individuals.
This is not surprising, as the high-risk dummy identifies those illnesses which have a
high risk of mortality. To better compare the two high risk groups, I rerun the above
specification, changing the comparison group to high-risk insured individuals. The
results are in Table 1.16.
The comparison group for Table 1.16 is insured high-risk individuals. Here, the
uninsured high-risk patients are 56.5% more likely than the insured high-risk patients
to die. When we compare these rates of mortality to quantity of service demanded in
section 5.1.2, I observe that even though uninsured patients received the same level
of service for high risk diseases, their rates of mortality are much higher. I will next
examine mortality rates by income quantile
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Table 1.16.




Insured lowrisk 0.0708∗∗∗ (0.0257)
Uninsured lowrisk 0.0795∗∗∗ (0.0292)
Uninsured highrisk 1.565∗∗∗ (0.144)
Ave Income 1.000 (0.000000930)
Observations 1103074
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Mortality Rates by Income Quantiles
In order to determine if income is a predictor for mortality rates, I add average
income by zip code interactions with insurance to the specification below:
logit(death) = β0 + Pβp + Insurance dummyβinsurance + Income groupsβincome
+Insurance ∗ Income groupsβi +Hβhosp + yearβyr + ε
(1.12)
P is matrix of patient characteristics: age category, race, average income by zip
code, marital status, sex, and H is a matrix of patient characteristics at the hospital:
ID, APRDRG, severity, mortality. Results can be found in Table 1.17.
In Table 1.17, where we observe that there is no statistically significant difference
in mortality rates for insured and uninsured individuals who live in the poorest zip
codes. In fact, for all insured individuals, there is no significant variation in rates of
mortality based on the wealth of the zip code. For uninsured individuals, too, there
is no statistically significant variation in the bottom 6 quantiles, but individuals in
the top two quantiles are 2 and 1.8 times as likely to die as uninsured individuals
living in the 1st quantile of zip codes. While we typically associate wealth with good
health, for uninsured individuals the risk of mortality is doubled for those residing in
the wealthiest zip codes. Comparing mortality to readmission and demand results,
we saw that these uninsured, high-average-income individuals received more services
than uninsured counterparts from the bottom quantile of income, and were more
likely to be readmitted than both their insured counterparts or uninsured individuals
living in the poorest zip codes. Therefore, it does not seem that an initial reduction
in service or deferred readmission is causing these high rates of mortality. The next
subsection examines income and high/low risk interactions to explain these differences
by examining specific diagnoses.
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Table 1.17.





income groups8==2 1.061 (0.0536)
income groups8==3 0.991 (0.0526)
income groups8==4 0.978 (0.0542)
income groups8==5 0.968 (0.0570)
income groups8==6 0.928 (0.0542)
income groups8==7 0.930 (0.0565)
income groups8==8 0.970 (0.0610)
Uninsured income2 0.762 (0.136)
Uninsured income3 1.080 (0.196)
Uninsured income4 1.137 (0.196)
Uninsured income5 1.030 (0.191)
Uninsured income6 1.240 (0.235)
Uninsured income7 2.062∗∗∗ (0.366)







Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Mortality Rates by Income Quantiles and High/Low Risk of Mortality
In the next specification, I examine the interaction between risk of mortality (high
and low) and 8 income quantiles.
In the next specification, I examine the interaction between risk of mortality (high
and low) and 8 income quantiles. As the specification below shows, I interacted this
’high risk’ variable with uninsured status and income groups.
logit(death) = β0 + Pβp + insurance dummyβins + Income groupsβincome
+insurance ∗ income groupsβii + insurance ∗ high riskβih
+insurance ∗ high risk ∗ income groupsβihi + hospital idβhosp + βdrg ∗ drg
+severityβseverity +mortalityβmort + yearβyr + ε
(1.13)
Notice that in Table 1.18, both insured and uninsured individuals in the ‘high risk
group’ have much higher rates of mortality. Insured individuals in the high risk group
are nearly 15 times as likely to die as insured individuals with APRDRGs that are
not in the high risk group. Uninsured individuals with high risk diagnosis are nearly
15.5 times as likely to die as insured individuals in the low risk group, though this
slight increase over the mortality rates of the insured is not significant.19
When one looks at uninsured individuals with high-risk APRDRGs in the top two
average income groups, we see triple the rates of mortality when compared to similarly
diagnosed uninsured individuals living in low income zip codes. Furthermore, there
is no difference in mortality rates by income group for any of the insured individuals,
and with the exception of weak significance for uninsured, low risk, income group 7,
we see no variation in mortality rates by income for uninsured individuals.
This result of high mortality among uninsured, high-risk individuals who reside
in the top quarter of average income by zip code is unexpected, as typically we think
19I have also done this analysis using the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Inpatient








Insured highrisk 14.90∗∗∗ (5.329)
Uninsured lowrisk 1.034 (0.148)
Uninsured highrisk 15.48∗∗∗ (6.760)
Ins low income2 1.080 (0.0600)
Ins low income3 1.006 (0.0594)
Ins low income4 0.974 (0.0588)
Ins low income5 0.950 (0.0614)
Ins low income6 0.944 (0.0604)
Ins low income7 0.947 (0.0627)
Ins low income8 0.991 (0.0677)
Ins high income2 0.924 (0.100)
Ins high income3 0.930 (0.109)
Ins high income4 1.015 (0.116)
Ins high income5 1.078 (0.130)
Ins high income6 0.927 (0.112)
Ins high income7 0.919 (0.112)
Ins high income8 0.911 (0.112)
Unin low income2 0.726 (0.157)
Unin low income3 1.090 (0.233)
Unin low income4 1.169 (0.235)
Unin low income5 1.055 (0.231)
Unin low income6 1.034 (0.230)
Unin low income7 1.597∗ (0.344)
Unin low income8 1.381 (0.310)
Unin high income2 0.809 (0.295)
Unin high income3 0.976 (0.381)
Unin high income4 1.057 (0.381)
Unin high income5 1.024 (0.391)
Unin high income6 1.842 (0.662)
Unin high income7 3.361∗∗∗ (1.134)
Unin high income8 2.883∗∗ (0.984)
Black 0.937∗ (0.0289)
Observations 1103074
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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of income as being a positive predictor of health. This increase in mortality is not
associated with initial lower provisions of services or lower rates of readmissions. It
also is not consistent with a demand story, where the uninsured individuals who are
very credit constrained should be more likely to die. It is the individuals who, based
on previous demand, should be the least likely to die who have this high rate of
mortality. The focus of this work is on the relationship between service provision and
bad health outcomes. To that end, there is no evidence that this anomalous result is
related to prior levels of service or readmission rates. However, it is interesting, and
so I will make a few comments about it.
When one takes equation 1.13 and adds an additional interaction with Race,
Black have much worse health outcomes. Being in the ’high risk’ group and Black
gave 12 times the rates of mortality for uninsured individuals and 13 times the rates
of mortality for insured individuals. In this same specification, high-risk, uninsured
whites had no increase in mortality in the top two quantiles of income, while these
same black individuals had 3.3 to 3.5 times the rates of mortality. It seems that this
result is driven by Black patients.
A word of caution, however, these results are based off extremely small samples.
For example, in income quantile 7, there were 13 individuals who died who were
black, uninsured, and high risk. This unusual pattern of high mortality may be
attributable to small number of uninsured patients in the high income quantiles.
Complete regression results with race interactions can be found in Appendix I.
The nature of these high-risk diseases is suggestive as to why these particular dis-
eases may disproportionately affect uninsured individuals from wealthier zip codes.
These diseases (tracheostomy, liver disease, stroke, respiratory failure, pulmonary em-
bolism, lung and colon cancer, heart attacks and pneumonia) drive the vast majority
of the difference in mortality rates between insured and uninsured individuals. After
consulting with physicians, I offer some preliminary explanations as to why these
particular diseases seem to be so problematic.
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These diseases can be classified into three categories: timing, prevention, and
behavioral. Diseases of timing are those where earlier treatment has a dramatic effect
on mortality. This category includes pneumonia, hemorrhagic and non-hemorrhagic
strokes, pulmonary embolisms (blood clots in one’s legs that travel to the lung),
and tracheostomy (a procedure for individuals who will be on a ventilator for over
a month). For each of these diseases a delay in treatment leads to a higher risk of
mortality.
Diseases of prevention are those where frequent preventative care, screening, or
monitoring make a substantial difference for mortality rates. These diseases include
pulmonary edema and respiratory failure (which is caused by congestive heart failure),
heart attacks, and colon cancer. In the first two cases, worse primary care leads to
worse heart disease and more death, while with colon cancer, later detection leads to
higher rates of mortality.
Diseases of behavior are those where individual choices have a substantial effect
on likelihood of contracting the illness. These illnesses include lung cancer, alcoholic
liver disease and liver disease which starts as hepatitis C. Smoking and drinking
increase one’s risk for lung cancer and alcoholic liver disease, while hepatitis C is
more prevalent among IV drug users. Future work should determine if this result is
robust across additional years or if it is a phenomena of small samples.
Given that demand for medical services for high-risk illnesses was the same for
insured and uninsured patients once differences in patient characteristics were taken
into account, that readmission rates did not vary by income quantile for high-risk
illnesses, and that mortality rates were identical with the exception of Black unin-
sured patients in the top two income quantiles, it seems reasonable to conclude that
uninsured individuals do not have adverse health effects from being uninsured when
they have a a high risk illness.
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1.6 Conclusions
This paper investigated if uninsured individuals receive less care, if they have dif-
ferent rates of readmission to hospitals, and if they have different rates of mortality
than their insured counterparts. Using a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, I find unin-
sured individuals receive 8.3% fewer services than their insured counterparts. Assum-
ing that income was a limiting factor for procuring insurance, I ran Blinder-Oaxaca
decompositions for 8 quantiles of average income by zip code; the most affected in-
dividuals were uninsured individuals living in the poorest 1
8
of zip codes (by average
income). There was nearly a 14% reduction in services not attributable to patient
characteristics for uninsured individuals in poor zip codes compared to their insured
counterparts. Looking at uninsured individuals who lived in the wealthiest zip codes,
the gap in the level of services not attributable to characteristics narrowed to about
7%. This provides evidence that uninsured individuals reduce their level of medical
services due to concerns about prices. As we look from one quantile of income to
the next— looking at increases in average income by zip code—we see a pattern of
increased levels of service demanded.
However, when I also include an interaction of income quantiles with a high/low
risk of mortality dummy variable, I find that for high risk illnesses, insurance status
does not predict the quantity of services demanded. When uninsured patients face a
high risk of death, they don’t elect to forgo services. For patients with a low risk of
mortality, we see the most reductions in quantity of services demanded for individuals
in the lowest quantile of income.
The next question this paper addresses is if this reduction in services for uninsured
individuals has an impact on other health outcomes. I will first discuss readmission
rates. Overall, uninsured patients were 72% as likely to be readmitted as their insured
counterparts. When I include a high-risk dummy interaction, I find that for high-risk
illnesses, there is no difference in rates of readmission.
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To determine if income is a predictive factor in readmission rates, I interacted an
uninsured dummy variable with the 8 income quantiles. I find uninsured individuals
in the bottom quantile of zip codes are 62.5% as likely to be readmitted as their in-
sured counterparts. Uninsured individuals were increasingly likely to be readmitted
as their income increased, with the top income quantile being 1.34 times as likely to
be readmitted as uninsured individuals in the bottom quantile. This provides evi-
dence that uninsured individuals living in poorer zip codes return to the hospital less
frequently due to income constraints. Among insured individuals, there was minimal
variation in admission rates by income. Uninsured individuals in every quantile had
lower rates of readmission than insured individuals in the same quantile of income.
The gap in readmission rates between uninsured and insured individuals fell from 62%
in the bottom quantile to 85% in the top quantile. Here, as income rises, uninsured
individuals chose more services and higher rates of readmission.
Next, I consider if illnesses with a high or low risk of mortality have differing
patterns of readmissions by income quantile. For diseases with a low risk of mortality,
individuals from lower quantiles have lower rates of readmission. As average income
increases, readmission rates rise, though never to the rates of insured patients. Insured
patients with both high and low risk illnesses have approximately identical rates of
readmission. Uninsured individuals in the high risk group are admitted at an equal
rate across income quantiles. Again we find that when faced with a grave illness,
uninsured individuals do not elect fewer services than their insured counterparts, but
when the illness has a low risk of mortality, they chose to return to the hospital less
frequently.
Finally, I will discuss differences in mortality rates by insurance status. Overall,
uninsured individuals are 23% more likely to die than their uninsured counterparts.
When I interact an uninsured dummy with a low and high risk dummy, I find that for
low risk patients, the uninsured are 12% more likely to die. For the high risk illnesses,
the uninsured are 57% more likely to die. When I consider income as a predictor of
mortality, income is largely a poor predictor except for uninsured individuals in the
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top two income quantiles who have double the rate of mortality of their insured
counterparts, though this seems likely to be an issue of a small sample.
For low risk illnesses, uninsured individuals received less care, and had lower rates
of readmission, and this translated into a 12% increase in rates of mortality. Uninsured
low income individuals saw the biggest reductions in services and the lowest rates of
readmissions, suggesting that at the current prices, they preferred to demand fewer
services. As the income constraint was relaxed—by examining more affluent income
quantiles— uninsured individuals sought out more services and were more likely to
be readmitted to the hospital.
While Maryland has debt forgiveness to 150% of the poverty line—making care
costless to the poorest individuals— I do not find a response to this ‘low price’ in
the data. While the lowest income quantile includes families up to about $41,000
dollars a year, and therefore should include a large number of the individuals eligible
for free care, these patients demand the fewest services, and have the lowest rates of
readmission compared with their insured counterparts. Given that the gap in services
between uninsured and insured patients drops as income quantile increases, income
is constraining the quantity of services demanded.
This work is broadly applicable under the implementation of the ACA. With finan-
cial penalties for not holding health insurance, many individuals are opting for care
with a high deductible plan. Prior to meeting the deductible, insured individuals are
much like uninsured individuals in Maryland: they pay the whole bill, but have access
to negotiated rates. Future work should conduct this analysis at a disease-specific
level, to determine if preventative services or substance abuse cessation programs
should be covered prior to a deductible being met. At a state level, this work could
inform estimates of the increased use of services, particularly for low-risk illnesses, as
individuals with high deducible plans consume like the uninsured in Maryland.
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2. HOSPITAL-INSURER BARGAINING POWER AND
NEGOTIATED RATES
with James Bland
Abstract: In addition to risk-sharing, U.S. health insurance companies
negotiate rates for services with hosptials. The price of service can vary
depending on which entity, if any, is insuring the patient. Insurers (and
possibly their customers) benefit from negotiating through lower prices,
while hospitals benefit through higher patient volume.
Using Massachusetts’ Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA)
data, we use hospital and insurer characteristics to estimate negotiated
prices specific to hospital-insurer pairs. We investigate the relationship
between two important quantities: (i) the charged amount that hospitals
bill for their services, and (ii) the amount that hospitals are paid for
insured patients. These numbers differ because the former is a function
only of the services provided and the hospital’s “chargemaster” prices,
while the latter is the result of negotiation.
We find that payments for privately insured patients are on average 38%
of charges when payments are made on a fee-for-service basis. However
this ratio varies greatly by hospital and insurer. Compared to community
hospitals without an emergency room, academic medical centers are com-
pensated 15% more for their services, and hospitals with an emergency
room are compensated 7% more than those without.
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2.1 Introduction
Health insurance in the US performs two functions for consumers. The first is
the traditional function of transferring wealth from good to bad states of the world.
The other is the result of the increased bargaining power that follows from having an
insurance company act (in part) on behalf of a large number of customers. Insurers
can, and do, negotiate prices with hospitals so that, for the same services provided,
the hospital is paid less for the insured patients than it would otherwise charge an
uninsured patient. The benefit to insurers of this ex-ante negotiation is that their
costs are lower. Some of this discount may also be passed on to consumers in the
form of lower premiums.1 For hospitals, negotiation can ensure higher volumes of
admissions, because insurers can direct their customers away from hospitals that fail
to reach an agreement, typically by having a higher co-insurance rate for “out-of-
network” hospitals compared to those that are in network.
Using data from Massachusetts Center for Health Information Analysis (CHIA),
we estimate these negotiated rates from patient-level insurance claims and hospital
discharge data. We find considerable variation in the amount paid for (normalized)
services. This variation comes from three sources. (i) At any given hospital, the
payment made for services depends on the patient’s insurer. This variation can be
interpreted as insurers having different bargaining powers with the hospital. (ii) Hold-
ing the insurer constant, the payment for services depends on the hospital at which
the patient was treated. We interpret this as evidence of hospitals having different
bargaining power over insurers. (iii) Considerable variation in these payments is left
over, even after controlling for the patient’s hospital and insurer. The existence of
this residual variation is testimony to the imperfectly-competitive, and imperfectly
understood nature, of health care markets.
1Once insurance companies have negotiated a lower payment. They may either rent-seek or pass
the savings on to consumers. While it is not clear which of these actions the insurance company will
take, from the point of view of social welfare, we would be interested in the latter.
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The contribution of this paper is that we (1) calculate variation within a hospital-
insurance pair, (2) examine how this within-pair variation compares to the variation
of prices between different hospital-insurer pairs. In doing so, we contribute to the
literature studying competition in health care and insurance markets, by adding a
patient-specific level of observation whereas previous studies such as Cooper et al.
(2015) and Ho and Lee (2015) have used a hospital as the level of observation.
2.2 Literature Review
Features of hospital-insurer negotiations: Gaynor et al. (2015) outline four ele-
ments that characterize negotiation between hospitals and insurers, and the incentives
faced by insured individuals:
1. Insurers can encourage patients to go to particular hospitals over others through
differential co-insurance rates. Hospitals with which the insurer has negotiated
a favorable price have a low “in-network” rate. Hospitals with which the insurer
has not negotiated have a higher “out-of-network” rate.
2. Except for co-insurance, patients do not pay directly for their care.2
3. At the time inpatient care is needed, the patient is generally locked-in to their
insurance plan, and so cannot change plans to access the negotiated rate of
another insurance product that would (ex-post) be better to treat their illness.
4. Insurers negotiate with hospitals over network status (patients pay lower co-
insurance rates at in-network hospitals),and how the hospital will be compen-
sated for services. In our dataset, the reimbursement structure is mostly on a
fee-for-service basis (e.g.: the insurer pays a fraction of the amount charged by
the hospital), or a DRG basis (e.g.: the insurer pays the hospital a flat rate
determined by the patient’s diagnosis and severity of illness).
2While deductibles are common in the US health insurance industry, it is not the focus of Gaynor’s
study, nor does it affect hospital-insurance negotiations as it is focused on the spitting of the payment
between insured individuals and insurance companies.
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Reinhardt (2006) documents some of the features of how payments are made
between hospitals and insurers. Each hospital has a “charge master”, a list of prices
for each procedure performed in the hospital. Charges reported by the hospital are
the sum of the prices from this list of all services performed on a patient. For insured
patients, charges typically differ from the amount the hospital is compensated (by
the insurer and patient together), Compensation is based on a negotiated rate agreed
upon between the hospital and insurer. An implication of this, and the focus of
our study, is that a hospital’s compensation for a particular patient depends on the
patient’s insurer, and by extension the relative bargaining power of the hospital and
the insurer during the negotiation.
Market power: Gaynor et al. (2015) document significant and increasing concen-
tration of both hospitals and insurers. Data on insurers suggests that they are not
price-takers either when dealing with employers, or with health care providers. Dafny
(2008) provides evidence that insurers have market power over employers in that they
can extract some surplus from more profitable firms through higher premiums. If the
insurance market were competitive, premiums for the same health plan would be the
same across firms. Dafny et al. (2009) also show that premiums increase when in-
surers merge. On the provider side of insurers’ operations, they also find a decline
in physicians’ compensation and employment when insurers merge. There is also
evidence of varying negotiating power on the hospital side of the market. For exam-
ple, Ho (2008) estimates that “star” hospitals and capacity-constrained hospitals can
command markups of about 25% of revenues. Other estimated markups were much
lower. Our analysis generally agrees with this markup: we estimate that academic
medical centers with an emergency room are compensated approximately 23% more
than community hospitals without an emergency room.
Cooper et al. (2015) use insurance claims data of individuals with private employer-
sponsored insurance to document variation in prices paid to hospitals. They estimate
prices paid for privately insured individuals that vary by a factor of three over the
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Hospital Referral Regions. These prices are not strongly correlated (0.14) with similar
compensations for Medicare beneficiaries, but are associated with measures of market
power, Herfindahl indexes and counts of hospitals within a market, suggesting that
hospitals’ compensation for the privately insured is not driven by cost. Prices for
specific procedures vary by even greater factors. Our analysis complements that of
Cooper et al. (2015) by exploiting a more detailed data set, albeit only including
observations from Massachusetts.
If variation in negotiated prices is driven by varying levels of competition, then
prices should be lower in markets with more competitive hospitals. Ho and Lee
(2015) use exposure to Kaiser Permanente, a large vertically integrated insurer, as
a measure of competition in a health care market. Hospitals in more competitive
markets typically have lower prices, however attractive hospitals are able to negotiate
higher rates.
Welfare implications for insured individuals: Negotiated prices could affect
patients’ welfare for several reasons. Firstly, since insured patients typically pay a
fixed fraction of the medical bill (the co-insurance rate), a lower negotiated rate means
lower out-of-pocket expenses.This effect may be somewhat mitigated by hospitals’ re-
sponse to lower prices. Using an exogenous change in Medicare pricing, Dafny (2003)
shows that hospitals respond to lower prices by “upcoding” patients to diagnosis codes
that attract higher reimbursement, although she finds no evidence of an increase in
the intensity of care. Secondly, depending on their market power, insurers may pass
some of the savings on to consumers in the form of lower premiums. However Dafny
et al. (2015) show that premiums are typically lower in markets with more insur-
ers. At least by this measure, it seems that the between-insurer competition effect
on premiums is stronger than any passed-through costs of higher negotiated prices in
more competitive markets.3 Ho and Lee (2015) find consolidation of insurers increases
3If we make the assumption that patient illnesses are spread evenly across insurance companies, then
the actuarially fair price of insurance should be constant. If this were the case, one could compare
premiums to determine measures of surplus. In a perfect world we would know both actuarially fair
prices and premiums, and look at the difference between the two.
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premiums and find a heterogeneous effect on negotiated prices. Another concern for
the welfare of consumers could be through the restricted choice set imposed by an
insurer’s network. Assuming no price effect, Ho (2006) estimates a welfare loss of
about $1 billion per year in the markets studied due to restricted choice sets. As Ho
notes, this loss may be mitigated by price reductions at the hospitals remaining in
the insurer’s network. Using a natural experiment, Gruber and McKnight (2016) find
that consumers are highly price sensitive to limited-network insurance plans, and that
those who switch to them had almost 40% lower medical expenses than those who did
not. This reduction in expenditure is attributable to reductions in both demand and
price for services, especially for specialist and hospital care. They found substitution
effects in the direction of primary care.
2.3 Data Description
We use two datasets produced by the Massachusetts Center for Health Information
and Analysis (CHIA). The first of these is the All Payer Claims Database (henceforth
APCD), the set of records submitted by insurance companies to the state of Mas-
sachusetts, and provides detailed information about charges, the amount paid by the
insurance company, the patient’s out-of-pocket amount, details on deductibles. The
second is the Massachusetts Acute Hospital Case Mix Database (henceforth Case
Mix), the set of medical records submitted by the medical providers to the state.
While the data set is rich, including outpatient care, we restrict ourselves for this
study to inpatient hospital services only. These inpatient records include demographic
information as well as detailed information about diagnosis, procedures, etc.
We capitalize on the rich information about payments (in APCD) and patients
(Case Mix) through an aggregated merge of the two datasets. The inpatient records
in both Case Mix and APCD are a census of hospital admissions of privately insured
patients for the state of Massachusetts. The two datasets are distributed yearly,
but since reporting periods differ overlap for nine months of the year. Therefore
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we observe every admission of a privately insured patient in Massachusetts between
January and September of 2013 (inclusive). To this end, we first collapse the APCD by
patient episode (multiple line items are associated with each patient episode),4 then
use episode-specific characteristics documented in both datasets to merge the two
files. These include patient age, gender, residential zip code, hospital zip code, and at
least one of the following: diagnosis code, principal procedure code and total charges
within $1000. For the overlapping 9-month period of the two datasets, we match
approximately 65% of privately insured patients. Of the patients we do match, over
a third of them match on all three criteria (principal diagnosis, principal procedure,
and total charges within $1000), about 40% match on two criteria.
2.3.1 Some important variables
Table 1 shows summary statistics of some variables in the merged dataset. Sum-
mary statistics are calculated separately for two different payment methodologies,
Fee For Service (FFS) and Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), which are discussed in
more detail below. Of particular interest are the first three variables summarized in
this table, allowed charged and paid, which capture different ways of accounting
for hospital services.
4For example, a patient may go to the hospital and have separate charges from radiology and surgery.
These would show up as separate line items in APCD. Since we are interested in all charges associated




mean sd mean sd
allowed 6902 12481 10076 12645
charged 19171 21954 20281 23210
paid 6771 11064 10810 13956
weight imp 1.126 1.124 1.369 1.484
aoverwi 6095 7456 8066 6719
poverwi 6051 7472 8992 8337





The first variable, allowed, documents the maximum amount to be paid to the
hospital for a particular illness or procedure. Specifically, the CHIA Submission Guide
instructs:
Report the maximum amount contractually allowed, and that a carrier
will pay to a provider for a particular procedure or service. This will vary
by provider contract and most often it is less than or equal to the fee
charged by the provider.
APCD Medical Claims File Submission Guide, p 38.
If patients were homogeneous, the mean of the allowed variable would represent
negotiated rates between the hospital and the insurance company.
The second variable charged is the amount the hospital charged for the services
received by a patient for a particular visit. The documentation for this variable
suggests it is independent of insurance type and payment methodology. One could
view this as the ‘sticker price’ for services, or, following the language used in Reinhardt
(2006), we could think of these as the ‘charge master’ prices. It is worth observing
that the charges are very similar between the two payment methodologies: DRG and
FFS.
The paid variable is the total amount paid to the hospital. There are, however, a
few different methodologies to determine payments, the most frequent of which is fee-
for-service. As the name suggests, charges are accrued for each service. For example,
for each x-ray the insurance company pays $150. This methodology for payments
accounts for about 40% of our inpatient records.
The next largest payment methodology in our data set is a Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) system. DRG systems pay based on the patient illness, not on services
received. For example, a patient comes in and is admitted with pneumonia. Once
the diagnosis is determined (in this example, pneumonia), the patient is assigned to a
DRG and based on that DRG the insurance company pays the hospital a flat fee (say
$7000). This payment is invariant if the patient receives a great deal of services or a
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very few services. DRG payments account for about 35% of our data. While there are
a few other payment systems, no other single system accounts for a large fraction of
our data. As these two payment methodologies are quite different, summary statistics
are provided separately for both.
It is important to note that for some patients paid is larger than charged. At
first, this is quite counter-intuitive. Why would one pay more than one is charged for
services? However, it is precisely because of the variation in payment methodologies
that the paid to charged ratio can be greater than 1. Take a patient who is admitted
under a DRG system. This patient’s payments are determined by the DRG classi-
fication, not by the services they receive. As such, their payment may exceed their
charges, which is a function of the services they actually receive in the hospital.
As not all illnesses require the same level of service provision, a weighting system
was developed by Medicare and Medicaid. These weights, which are based on illness
classification, allow us to compare average service provision for numerous illnesses.
We had DRG illness classifications for approximately 40% of our data.
The next variable weight imp (“Imputed Weight”) is a derived variable equal
to patient’s charges relative to the casemix-adjusted average charges at the patient’s
hospital. The reason for this normalization is that we wish to attribute differences in
our estimates of negotiated rates to differences in aspects of the bargaining process,
rather than hospitals having different charge-master prices.5 We interpret this vari-
able as an aggregation of the quantity of services received, relative to the services a
patient at that hospital would receive if they had a DRG weight of 1. Therefore, a
patient with an imputed weight of 2 receives twice the services (measured in charges)
than a patient with an imputed weight of 1. It is worth noting that the average weight
of fee-for-service patients is lower than that for diagnosis related group patients. We
would interpret this to mean that our DRG patients are ‘sicker’ and require about
1.37/1.13− 1 ≈ 21% more services than out FFS patients.
5We motivate this normalization in more detail in Appendix B.1, and describe the procedure for
calculating imputed weight in Appendix B.2.
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We have also included the variables aoverwi (allowed over weight) and poverwi
(paid over weight) to be able to better compare across payment types. When we look
at an illness adjusted measure of allowable services, the two values $6,100 (for FFS)
and $8,065 (for DRGs) are far closer than when we consider the raw means $6,933
(for FFS) and $10,104 (for DRGs). Similarly, when we compare poverwi (paid over
weight), we see that the difference in payment for equally ill patients between FFS and
DRG has dropped ($6052 vs $8991), compared to their per-patient averages without
accounting for illness levels($6791 vs $10843). The goal of this paper is to understand
the ‘markdown’ of charges for normalized patients.
2.4 Results
We begin this section by testing our assumption that FFS payments are a fraction
of charges. Table 2.2 shows the result of regressing log payments against log(imputed
weight) for FFS payments, with various controls. If FFS payments are truly a frac-
tion of charges, then we would expect a coefficient of 1 on log(imputed weight) in a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(weight imp) 1.040 1.029 1.009 0.740 0.737 0.723
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.00922) (0.00909) (0.00908)
N 47278 47278 47278 47278 47278 47278
R2 0.168 0.182 0.226 0.417 0.441 0.467
AIC 191793.2 191004.3 188456.6 175050.1 173110.9 172188.6
BIC 191810.7 191056.9 188947.4 175260.4 173794.4 178630.0
H0: fixed markdown 0 0.00600 0.364 0 0 0
Controls
EMS region - Y - - - -
Hospital - - Y - Y Y
Insurer - - - Y Y Y
Interactions - - - - - H × I
No. of controls 0 4 54 22 76 733
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.2.
OLS regressions with FFS log payments against log(charges), with
various controls. Significance stars are suppressed. The row labeled
“H0: fixed markdown” reports the p-value for the test that the co-
efficient on log(weigh imp) is equal to 1 (i.e., a linear relationship
between payments and imputed weight).
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regression of log(payments) on log(imputed weight) and control variables.6 That is,
letting ci denote the controls used, the relationship would be:
log(paidi) = log(weighti) + ρ̃ci (2.1)
The row labeled “H0: fixed markdown” reports the p-value for this test. While we
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 1 for all but model (3), we note that in
models (1), (2), and (3) that the coefficients are close to one, indicating a close to
linear relationship. Looking at the coefficient on log(weight imp) in columns (4) (5)
and (6), we see some variation between 0.723 and 0.740. Given our understanding
of FFS payments, we have run the OLS regressions from columns 5 (which includes
hospital and insurer fixed effects) and have plotted the coefficients for the general
model and one in which we impose that the coefficient on log(imputed weight) is
1. These coefficient plots can be found in Appendix B.4. What we see in these
plots is that while the slope coefficients differ significantly from 1, our estimates of
negotiated rates do not vary much between these two specifications: the ranking and
approximate levels are very close.
We also investigate the relationship between (log) imputed weight and (log) pay-
ments for patients under the DRG payment systems. Table 2.3 shows the result of
regressing log(payments) against log(imputed weight) for DRG payments, with var-
ious controls. In the DRG system, the hospital is reimbursed for treating a patient
with a particular disease, and this payment is independent of the services the pa-
tient actually receives. We observe that while the coefficient on log(imputed weight)
is somewhat more consistent across the different specifications, that the predictive
power of the models is lower. This is consistent with our understanding of how reim-
bursement works for patients under a DRG system.
6If we assume charges are a linear combination of services and charge master prices, then we expect
insurance companies to pay a fixed fraction of these prices. In a log specification, then, for a 10%
increase in charges we would expect a 10% increase in payments, which is why we assert that this
coefficient should be equal to 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(weight imp) 0.929 0.929 0.892 0.924 0.884 0.884
(0.00987) (0.00983) (0.00930) (0.00992) (0.00934) (0.00934)
N 35631 35631 35631 35631 35631 35631
R2 0.199 0.206 0.301 0.200 0.303 0.309
AIC 136066.6 135761.5 131319.7 136049.1 131259.9 131168.5
BIC 136083.6 135812.4 131794.6 136116.9 131785.7 132635.7
H0: fixed markdown 0 0 0 0 0 0
Controls
EMS region - Y - - - -
Hospital - - Y - Y Y
Insurer - - - Y Y Y
Interactions - - - - - H × I
No. of controls 0 4 54 6 60 171
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.3.
OLS regressions with DRG log payments against log(inputed weight),
with various controls. Significance stars are suppressed. The row
labeled “H0: fixed markdown” reports the p-value for the test that the
coefficient on log(weigh imp) is equal to 1 (i.e., a linear relationship
between payments and imputed weight).
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Next, we investigate the explanatory power of individual hospitals and insurers,
and their interactions, in explaining the ratio of payments to charges.7 This ratio
is of interest because it represents the fraction of charges for which the hospital is
compensated. In a fee-for-service environment, this ratio provides preliminary insight
into the rate negotiated between hospitals and insurance companies. We look at a
number of specifications using different controls, and evaluate the predictive power
of different models using both frequentest and Bayesian criteria. We consider both
linear and log specifications.
Table 2.4 reports various measures of goodness-of-fit for regressions of the paid to
charge ratio against controls for emergency medical service (EMS) regions, hospitals,
and insurers. Each column restricts the sample to a single payment type. Columns
1 and 2 report results when restricting the sample to fee-for-service (FFS) payments
with linear and log specifications. Since FFS payments are typically negotiated as a
fraction of charges, we would expect these regressions to have better fit than those
with DRG payment types. Looking at Columns (3) and (4), we see the same regres-
sions (both linear and log) for DRG payments. The better fit of the FFS model is
observed in the systematically higher R2 values reported in the first two columns, cor-
responding to FFS payments. We also observe that in both FFS and DRG payment
methods, the log specification fits the data better than the linear counterpart. This
is consistent with our understanding of how the industry handles reimbursement.
The bottom two panels report the Bayesian and Akaike information criteria for
the estimated models. For FFS payments, the BIC selects Model 4, which controls
for hospitals and insurers, but without interactions.8 The AIC selects Model 7, which
includes hospital-insurer interactions. This is due to the AIC and BIC differing in the
penalty function for adding more variables. For the BIC it is k log(N), where k and
N are the number of controls and the number of observations respectively. For the
7Looking at the ratio of payments to charges is a special case of regressing log(charges) against
log(payments), in which we are forcing the coefficient on log(charges) to be 1.
8Note in Table 2 the value for Model 4 is the lowest. As the BIC is a penalty function, lower numbers
indicate better performance.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
poverc log poverc poverc log poverc
Mean value 0.383∗∗∗ -1.962∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ -1.129∗∗∗
(172.99) (-234.16) (212.78) (-127.90)
N 47739 47739 35855 35855
Payment type FFS FFS DRG DRG
Number of controls
1 - EMS region (E) 4 4 4 4
2 - Hospital (H) 61 61 61 61
3 - Insurer (I) 22 22 6 6
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 83 83 67 67
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 85 85 68 68
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 154 154 84 84
7 - H & I (interacted) 779 779 179 179
R2
1 - EMS region (E) 0.00416 0.00682 0.00319 0.00436
2 - Hospital (H) 0.0565 0.0613 0.157 0.165
3 - Insurer (I) 0.139 0.258 0.00103 0.000808
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 0.191 0.310 0.158 0.166
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 0.191 0.310 0.158 0.166
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 0.197 0.314 0.159 0.166
7 - H & I (interacted) 0.234 0.342 0.163 0.173
Bayesian information criterion
0 - Constant only 66093 193233 63456 138603
1 - EMS region (E) 65937 192950 63384 138488
2 - Hospital (H) 63974 190868 57981 132792
3 - Insurer (I) 59164 179220 63482 138637
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 56850 176394 58003 132801
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 56866 176401 58012 132808
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 57286 176922 58149 132961
7 - H & I (interacted) 61786 181668 58971 133663
Model selected 4 4 2 2
Akaike information criterion
0 - Constant only 66093 193233 63456 138603
1 - EMS region (E) 65902 192915 63350 138454
2 - Hospital (H) 63438 190333 57463 132274
3 - Insurer (I) 58971 179027 63431 138586
4 - H & I (uninteracted) 56122 175666 57435 132233
5 - H, I, & E (uninteracted) 56120 175656 57435 132231
6 - H & (I & E interacted) 55934 175571 57436 132248
7 - H & I (interacted) 54951 174833 57452 132144
Model selected 7 7 4 7
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.4.
Regressions of the ratio of payments to charges, controlling for EMS
region, hospitals, insurers, and interactions thereof.
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AIC the penalty is 2k. As N is relatively large in our sample, these two criteria place
greatly different weight on the number of controls. We interpret these selections as
hospitals and insurers having varying bargaining power, which is supported by both
criteria. We interpret the AIC’s selection as hospital-insurance pairs being the level
of observation that best explains the variation in price.
For DRG payments, the BIC selects Model 2, which controls for hospitals. The
AIC selects Model 4 with a linear specification for the ratio of payments to charges,
which includes all hospitals and insurance companies without interactions. The AIC
selects Model 7 in the log specification, which includes all interactions. We now
turn our attention to understanding the variation in negotiated rates at the hospital-
insurance level.
2.4.1 Estimates of negotiated rates for FFS payments
In this section, we estimate negotiated rates for FFS payments, and document
the variation in rates across hospitals and insurers. We investigate negotiated rates
using payments per imputed weight as the relevant metric. Figures 2.1 and 2.2
show coefficient plots from a regression of the (log) paid per imputed weight ratio
against indicators for hospitals and insurers respectively, suppressing the constant
term. Differences in these coefficients represent fractional negotiated rate differences.
That is, if hospital A has a coefficient of 8.5, and hospital B has a coefficient of 9.0,
then hospital B’s negotiated rates are estimated to be on average exp(9.8−8.5) ≈ 1.65
times greater than hospital B’s. These figures document much variation in mean
compensation per weight by both hospital and insurer. For hospitals (Figure 2.1) we
see variation in negotiated rates by a factor of approximately exp(10.4 − 8.4) ≈ 7.4
(comparing New England Baptist to Anna Jacques). For insurers (Figure 2.2) Blue
Cross negotiates rates that are on average approximately one tenth (exp(−2.4− 0) ≈
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Fig. 2.1. Coefficients on hospital indicators estimated from regressing
log(payment per imputed weight) against indicators for hospitals and
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Fig. 2.2. Coefficients on insurer indicators estimated from regressing
log(Payment per imputed weight) against indicators for hospitals and
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Fig. 2.3. Estimates of negotiated rates for the largest hospital-insurer
pairs. Market shares are shown in parentheses (fraction of FFS ad-
missions). The full list of negotiated rates is shown in Appendix B.3.
Appendix B.3 shows estimates of payments per imputed weight for each hospital-
insurer pair with at least 30 admissions. We show these estimates for the three
largest insurers in Figure 2.3. Each value in this table reports the mean payment
made by an insurer for an imputed weight of 1, which we construct to be equivalent
to a DRG weight of 1. Column (7) of this table highlights great variation between
hospitals. For example, Berkshire Medical Center on average receives about $10,150
per imputed weight for insured individuals. This value is one of the highest in column
(7), and reflects this hospital’s geographic isolation: there are few substitute hospitals,
so insurers are less able to direct patients living in that area elsewhere. Overall,
Figure 2.3 shows that there is much more variation in compensation across insurers
than across hospitals.
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Fig. 2.4. Payment per imputed weight at Massachusetts General Hospital.
2.4.2 Within-pair variation
While previous literature has looked at hospitals as the level of observation, the
patient-level data used here allows us to examine the variation within a hospital-
insurer pair. In order to better understand the variation of the amount paid by both
the hospital and insurance company in relation to the amount charged by the hospital,
we look at the ratio of the total paid to imputed weight for each patient at a particular
hospital with a particular type of insurance. Figure 2.4 shows boxplots of the ratio of
payments to imputed weights for FFS payments at Massachusetts General Hospital
(the largest hospital by number of FFS payments). While this figure illustrates that
there is great variation in median payments for an imputed weight by insurer, there
is much left to be explained. We consider the interquartile ranges shown in this figure
to be economically significant, and wish to further understand this variation.
Table 2.5 investigates possible drivers of this variation by regressing the log ratio
of payments per imputed weight against log negotiated rates and some patient char-
acteristics. Column 1 shows the constant-only model, and column 2 introduces the
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log poverwi log poverwi log poverwi log poverwi log poverwi
log(negotiated rate) 1.609∗∗∗ 1.593∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0242) (0.0227)
female 0.198∗∗∗ 0.0331 0.0350
(0.0187) (0.0250) (0.0251)
5-18 years -0.603∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.0840) (0.0842)
17-24 years -0.428∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗
(0.0497) (0.0750) (0.0751)
24-44 years -0.192∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0540) (0.0539)
44-64 years -0.409∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0528) (0.0526)
over 64 years -0.651∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ -0.694∗∗∗
(0.0390) (0.0658) (0.0521)
Other Non-Federal Programs -1.745∗∗∗
(0.425)
Preferred Provider organization 0.922∗∗∗
(0.0871)
Point of Service 0.731∗∗∗
(0.0856)




Health Mainienance Organization 0.712∗∗∗
(0.0942)
Constant 7.676∗∗∗ -6.047∗∗∗ -6.192∗∗∗ -4.940∗∗∗ -4.779∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.115) (0.615) (0.717) (0.717)
Observations 30206 30206 30206 12396 12396
R2 0.000 0.323 0.339 0.329 0.320
AIC 124580.6 112789.6 112144.7 41894.8 42054.3
BIC 124588.9 112806.2 112535.5 42288.3 42403.3
Race and ethnicity controls? Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.5.
Regression of log payment per imputed weight against log negotiated
rates estimates and patient characteristics. Column 5 restricts the
dataset to only use observations that have no omitted values for the
regression in Column 4.
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log(negotiated rate) term. The R2 suggests that negotiated rates account for about
32% of the variation in this ratio. Within the merged dataset we have two candidates
for explaining at least some of the remaining 68%. Column 3 introduces patient de-
mographics: age, sex, race, and ethnicity. including these characteristics improves
slightly on the Column 2 regression. Of particular interest here is the positive and
significant coefficient on the female indicator variable, suggesting that insurers com-
pensate hospitals on average approximately 20% more than men for the same imputed
weight. This is explored further in Column 1 of Table 2.6, which interacts sex with
age categories. Here the effect goes away for all groups except for women aged be-
tween 17 and 44 years.9 It may be that insurers negotiate differently for maternity
care than for other services. However these demographic characteristics on their own
account for very little variation in the paid to imputed weight ratio. In Column (2)
we use only these demographics as explanatory variables, and achieve account for
only 5.2% of the variation.
Another possibility is that insurers negotiate with hospitals for each of their plans,
not for all of their customers together. If this was the case, then further slicing of
the data by plans should provide more predictive power for payments. In the APCD
we observe a variable categorizing the type of insurance plan a patient has. We
use these as additional explanatory variables in Column 4 of Table 2.5. These buy
marginally more explanatory power than controlling for patient demographics alone.
Together, we interpret Tables 2.5 and 2.6 as suggestive evidence that a large fraction
of hospitals’ compensation of insured patients is explained by negotiated rates at the
hospital-insurer level, but there still remains a large fraction of unexplained variation.
Some of this variation may be the result of hospitals and insurers negotiating a fraction
of charges for most services, but then negotiating other rates for some specific services,
such as those provided in a maternity ward, or in a specialized care unit.
9Approximately 30% of women admitted in this age range are admitted for maternity care.
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(1) (2)





5-18 years -0.639∗∗∗ -0.876∗∗∗
(0.0742) (0.0892)
17-24 years -0.800∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗
(0.0770) (0.0926)
24-44 years -0.663∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0678)
44-64 years -0.450∗∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗
(0.0490) (0.0590)
over 64 years -0.688∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0641)
female=1 × 5-18 years 0.0840 0.0726
(0.105) (0.126)
female=1 × 17-24 years 0.632∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.121)
female=1 × 24-44 years 0.707∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗
(0.0748) (0.0898)
female=1 × 44-64 years 0.0936 0.157
(0.0697) (0.0838)








Race and ethnicity controls? Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.6.
Regression of log payment per imputed weight against log negotiated
rates estimates and patient characteristics.
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2.5 Conclusion
Hospitals and insurers both have significant market power in the market for health
care. Exploiting that they can influence their customers’ hospital choices, insurers
negotiate lower prices for services. In return, hospitals are able to boost their admis-
sions from that insurer. The resulting negotiated rates mean that the price paid for
the same services at the same hospital varies by insurer.
This paper estimates these negotiated rates, and documents the variation in ne-
gotiated rates between hospitals and insurance companies. We look at this variation
within hospital-insurer pairs, with a single hospital and many insurers, with a single
insurer and many hospitals and across the state of Massachusetts. We find great vari-
ation in amounts paid for services across these three dimensions. Negotiated rates
appear to vary more by insurer than by hospital, suggesting that insurers’ bargaining
power is more heterogeneous than hospitals’. Our analysis shows that using charges
as a proxy for insured patients’ out-of-pocket expenses (i.e. co-insurance) may be
inaccurate if the sample includes more than one insurer.
This paper builds on existing studies with the use of the Massachusetts CHIA
APCD and Case Mix datasets. These allow us to analyze payments at the patient
level, with rich information about both illnesses and transactions. While negotiated
rates organize our data well, there remain unexplained differences in payments within
a hospital-insurer pair: within any hospital-insurer pair making FFS payments, the
relationship between payments and charges is not deterministic. Given our under-
standing of FFS payment arrangements, we conclude that negotiations happen over
finer measures of service than simply a fraction of charges. Possible candidates could
be (i) the most extreme case of negotiating prices for each and every service the hospi-
tal offers (e.g. minutes in the operating room, nights stayed, etc.), and (ii) negotiating
differential prices over types of service, for example patients in the maternity ward
could face different negotiated rates to patients in the emergency room. Controlling
for patient demographics suggests that at least the latter explanation is plausible.
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Further work in this area could approach this bargaining problem from a more
theoretical angle. In this paper we discuss negotiation while remaining agnostic as to
the bargaining game underlying the process. Our estimates of negotiated rates could
be used, along with estimated models of hospital demand, to structurally estimate
parameters in bargaining games. Such analysis would be useful in analyzing counter-
factual claims about the market for health insurance. As both sides of the market are
large, hospitals merging may increase prices, and insurers merging may lower prices.
The magnitude of these changes could be predicted with such a model. Additionally,




AHRQ, A. f. H. R. and Quality (2014). Fact sheet on inpatient quality indicators.
Association, A. H. (2015). Chart 4.6.
Association(AHA), A. H. (Feb 2015). Aggregate hospital payment-to-cost ratios for
private payers, medicare, and medicaid, 1993 - 2013.
Baicker, K., S. L. Taubman, H. L. Allen, M. Bernstein, J. H. Gruber, J. P. Newhouse,
E. C. Schneider, B. J. Wright, A. M. Zaslavsky, and A. N. Finkelstein (2013). The
Oregon experiment – effects of Medicaid on clinical outcomes. New England Journal
of Medicine 368 (18), 1713–1722.
Bartel, A. P., C. W. Chan, and S.-H. H. Kim (2014). Should hospitals keep their
patients longer? the role of inpatient and outpatient care in reducing readmissions.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bruen, B. K., L. Ku, X. Lu, and P. Shin (2013). No evidence that primary care physi-
cians offer less care to medicaid, community health center, or uninsured patients.
Health Affairs 32 (9), 1624–1630.
Carey, K. (2014). Measuring the hospital length of stay/readmission cost trade-off
under a bundled payment mechanism. Health Economics .
Commission, M. H. S. C. R. (2008). Aggregate hospital payment-to-cost ratios for
private payers, medicare, and medicaid, 1993 - 2013.
Cooper, Z., S. V. Craig, M. Gaynor, and J. Van Reenen (2015). The price ain’t
right? hospital prices and health spending on the privately insured. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dafny, L. (2008). Are health insurance markets competitive? Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dafny, L., M. Duggan, and S. Ramanarayanan (2009). Paying a premium on your
premium? consolidation in the us health insurance industry. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dafny, L., J. Gruber, and C. Ody (2015). More insurers lower premiums: Evidence
from initial pricing in the health insurance marketplaces. American Journal of Health
Economics .
Dafny, L. S. (2003). How do hospitals respond to price changes? Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
76
Finkelstein, A. and R. McKnight (2008). What did medicare do? the initial impact
of medicare on mortality and out of pocket medical spending. Journal of Public
Economics 92 (7), 1644–1668.
Finkelstein, A., S. Taubman, B. Wright, M. Bernstein, J. Gruber, J. P. Newhouse,
H. Allen, K. Baicker, et al. (2011). The oregon health insurance experiment: evidence
from the first year. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gaynor, M., K. Ho, and R. J. Town (2015, June). The industrial organization of
health-care markets. Journal of Economic Literature 53 (2), 235–84.
Gorodeski, E. Z., R. C. Starling, and E. H. Blackstone (2010). Are all readmissions
bad readmissions? New England Journal of Medicine 363 (3), 297–298.
Gruber, J. and R. McKnight (2016, May). Controlling health care costs through lim-
ited network insurance plans: Evidence from massachusetts state employees. Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8 (2), 219–50.
Hasan, O., D. O. Meltzer, S. A. Shaykevich, C. M. Bell, P. J. Kaboli, A. D. Auerbach,
T. B. Wetterneck, V. M. Arora, J. Zhang, and J. L. Schnipper (2010). Hospital
readmission in general medicine patients: a prediction model. Journal of General
Internal Medicine 25 (3), 211–219.
Ho, K. (2006). The welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the us medical care
market. Journal of Applied Econometrics 21 (7), 1039–1079.
Ho, K. (2008). Insurer-provider networks in the medical care market. American
Economic.
Ho, K. and R. S. Lee (2015). Insurer competition in health care markets.
HSCRC (2009). Report to the governor and general assembly pursuant to sections
2 and 3 of chapters 310 and 311 of the 2009 laws of maryland:.
HSCRC (2015). Uniform financial assistance application.
HSCRC (December 4,l 2013). Report on results of uncompensated care policy and
final recommendation to suspend the formula for calculating the hospital specific
results.
Keeler, E. B. and J. E. Rolph (1988). The demand for episodes of treatment in the
health insurance experiment. Journal of Health Economics 7 (4), 337–367.
Kronick, R. (2009). Health insurance coverage and mortality revisited. Health Ser-
vices Research 44 (4), 1211–1231.
Lave J, Pettengill J, S. L. V. J. (August 1981). Measurement issues in the develop-
ment of a hospital case mix index for medicare.
Manning, W. G., J. P. Newhouse, N. Duan, E. B. Keeler, and A. Leibowitz (1987).
Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized
experiment. The American Economic Review , 251–277.
MedPac (March 2012). Annual report to the governor.
77
Murray, R. (2009). Setting hospital rates to control costs and boost quality: the
maryland experience. Health Affairs 28 (5), 1395–1405.
Park, M. (July 15th, 2013). What types of hospitals have high charge-to-
reimbursement ratios?
Philbin, E. F., G. W. Dec, P. L. Jenkins, and T. G. DiSalvo (2001). Socioeconomic
status as an independent risk factor for hospital readmission for heart failure. The
American Journal of Cardiology 87 (12), 1367–1371.
Reinhardt, U. E. (2006). The pricing of US hospital services: chaos behind a veil of
secrecy. Health Affairs 25 (1), 57–69.
Reinhardt, U. E. (2011). The many different prices paid to providers and the flawed
theory of cost shifting: is it time for a more rational all-payer system? Health
Affairs 30 (11), 2125–2133.
Rogowski, J. and D. Byrne (1990). Comparison and evaluation of alternative drg
weight recalibration methods. Health Care Financing Review 12 (2), 87–101.
Smith, S. (Februrary 11th, 2014). Young invincibles’ ok with risk of no insurance.
Sommers, B. D., K. Baicker, and A. M. Epstein (2012). Mortality and access
to care among adults after state medicaid expansions. New England Journal of
Medicine 367 (11), 1025–1034.
Sommers, B. D., S. K. Long, and K. Baicker (2014). Changes in mortality after
massachusetts health care reform: a quasi-experimental study. Annals of Internal
Medicine 160 (9), 585–593.
Systems, H. I. (July, 2013). 3m apr drg classification system.
Udom (April 2013). Arr methodology health systems cost review committee.
Weissman, J. S. and A. M. Epstein (1993). The insurance gap: does it make a
difference? Annual Review of Public Health 14 (1), 243–270.
White, C., A. M. Bond, J. D. Reschovsky, and P. C. LTHPOLICY (2013). High
and varying prices for privately insured patients underscore hospital market power.
Center for Studying Health System Change Research Brief No.
White, F. A., D. French, F. L. Zwemer, and R. J. Fairbanks (2007). Care without
coverage: is there a relationship between insurance and ed care? The Journal of
Emergency Medicine 32 (2), 159–165.
Wilper, A. P., S. Woolhandler, K. E. Lasser, D. McCormick, D. H. Bor, and D. U.
Himmelstein (2009). Health insurance and mortality in us adults. American Journal
of Public Health 99 (12), 2289.
Zhang, D. J., E. Park, I. Gurvich, J. A. Van Mieghem, R. S. Young, and M. V.
Williams (2013). Hospital readmissions reduction program: An economic and oper-
ational analysis. Available at SSRN 2366493 .
APPENDICES
78
A. APPENDICES FOR UNISURED IN MARYLAND
A.1 Appendix A: Details of Base Rate Adjustments
The first thing to consider is the total prospective charges. Not all charges from
the hospital are included in this calculation. Specifically, patients who stay for only
one night are thrown out of allowable charges, as are some patients that are deemed
to be outliers. These adjustments determine a hospital’s previous year’s approved
charges. To determine the total prospective charges a few adjustments are made to
the approved charges from the previous year. The first adjustment is for inflation
and productivity using Global Insight’s index, which measures the effect of general
inflation in the economy on health care expenses. The second adjustment is a volume
adjustment, which relies upon a historically made assumption about variable costs.
The adjustment works as follows. If a hospital’s service volume increased 10 percent
in a year, in calculating the following years allowable revenue, only 85 percent of
the increase would be considered as admissible charges. This is assumed to be the
variable cost portion of the increased revenue of the hospital. The remaining adjust-
ments are small in comparison to the two above, but for the sake of completeness
are detailed below.The third adjustment considers any changes in the proportion of
Medicare/Medicaid patients to the hospital. This adjustment exists because Medicare
and Medicaid only pay 94% of charges. If there is growth in Medicare/Medicaid then
it could be disadvantageous to a hospital’s bottom line. For illustration, consider
the following example of a hospital with 200 million in charges and 100 million of
those charges belonging to Medicare and Medicaid patients. The discount from the
hospital to the government is 6 million: (1− .94)∗100 million. The existing $6 million
discount is taken into account in the charge structure. An adjustment would be made
only on the basis of growth in the amount of Medicare and Medicaid patients. If the
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total charges of the hospital remained at 200 million, but now 150 million was at-
tributable to Medicare and Medicaid, this growth in government-insured individuals
induces a volume adjustment to this hospital. With 150 million in charges attribute
to governmental insurance, this hospital would have a 9 million dollar shortfall, but
6 million was already accounted for in the initial cost structure. The volume adjust-
ment covers this 3 million of additional discounts to the government. When half of
the hospital’s charges were governmental, the hospital was getting 3 million of rev-
enue. To not disadvantage the hospital when its governmental charges rise to 150,
Maryland’s adjustment takes the 3 million ‘discount’ that previously was revenue, and
simply increases the its initial charges by this amount. Now this hospital would be
credited with 203 million in aggregate charges, its initial 200 million plus the 3 million
discount for the government. The fourth adjustment pertains to capital investment,
certificate-of-need project adjustments. If a hospital has major renovations, a por-
tion of those costs can be covered by an increased base rate. The fifth adjustment
is an adjustment for medical education. There are two types of medical education
expenses, direct medical education expenses (DME) and indirect medical education
expenses (IME). Both of these expenses are built into the base rate in levels. Thus,
any adjustment to the base rate would be because of growth in DME or IME. For
example, if a program added two more residents, their salaries would be an increase
in DME. Finally, there is an adjustment for changes in the rate of bad debt (un-
compensated care). To calculate future uncompensated care, an average is taken of
previous rates of uncompensated care and a prediction of uncompensated care based
on a regression. Again, only changes in uncompensated care require an adjustment;
levels are built into the base rate.
A.2 Appendix B: CMAD
To understand how it is calculated, we must first describe how weights are es-
tablished for each APRDRG. The Maryland commission has used two methodologies
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for calculation of weights. The current method adopted in 2006, though developed
by Lave J (1981), the Hospital Specific Relative Value (HSRV) method establishes
weights through an iterative process designed to reflect the clinical service expen-
diture of each APRDRG. HSRV weights removes charges associated with medical
education. Complete technical details can be found in Udom (2013). The previous
methodology, which is currently used by Medicare nationally, is the charge- based
weight method and is described below. The two methodologies produce very similar
weights. According to Rogowski and Byrne (1990) in over 95% of cases, the weights
differed by no more than 5%. The older methodology, charge based weights, is far
more intuitive and a brief description is below. Weights for each APRDRG are de-
rived from a standard rate calculation. The standard rate calculation is a ratio of the
average charges of all patients in the APRDRG and the average cost of everyone in
the sample.
Let wi denote the weight of APRDRG i, for i = 1, ..., A. Let the subscripts
ij indicate patient j in APRDRG i, with j = 1, ..., ni and ni the total number of
patients in APRDRG i. Let Cij be the charges, the amount billed, in connection with
the services received by patient j in APRDRG i — to the patient if uninsured, to the






















If charge per patient is the same for all APRDRGs, then all weights equal 1.
The numerator is the share of the charges to APRDRG i patients in total charges.
The denominator is the share of the number of patients in APRDRG i in the total
number of patients. So an APRDRG gets a weight greater than 1 if its share of total
charges is greater than its share of patients. An APRDRG gets a weight less than
1 if its share of total charges is less than its share of patients. Since charges are a
measure of the cost of providing the services then the weights might be interpreted
as a measure of the quantity of medical service provided to patients in an APRDRG.
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In this way, patients who are expected to consume more services ‘count more’
than patients who receive fewer services. When a single patient is discharged, we
talk about the ‘weight’ of their APRDRG. When we are describing a hospital’s level
of service, we have multiple patients with different diagnoses, so we sum the weights
of the individual patients APRDRGs as a measure of total hospital services. This
sum is the CMAD, a weighted value which conveys the difficulty of treating all the





where nh is the number of patients treated in the hospital in a given year.
Another way of understanding a CMAD is if there were no heterogeneity in illness,
i.e. in a world with homogeneous patients with one type of illness and risk factors,
the CMAD would simply count the number of people treated. CMAD is a measure
of how many ‘average’ patients were treated. In our heterogeneous world however,
a particularly service-intensive patient might have a weight of two, conveying that
they require twice as many services as the average patient. Thus, they ‘count’ as two
average patients when calculating CMAD.
When comparing charges per APRDRG weight, then, a constant level of charges/
APRDRG weight across insurance payer classes would suggest that patients require
the same level of services, weighted by illness and severity. This measure of charges
per weight will be used to compare relative demand across payer classes.
A.3 Appendix C: Summary Statistics for 2011-2013
Table A.1.
Summary Statistics from 2013
Self Responsible and Charity Medicare Medicaid Private Dual Enrolled
Minimum $ 8,523 $9,340 $9,153 $9,621 $8,820
Max $28,265 $25,336 $23,288 $21,761 $24,063
Mean $11,468 $12,319 $12,129 $12,320 $12,192
Median $10,387 $11,615 $11,047 $11,352 $11,367
Standard deviation 3381.64 2847.27 2774.31 2690.84 2909.48
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Table A.2.
Summary Statistics from 2012
Self Responsible and Charity Medicare Medicaid Private Dual Enrolled
Minimum $ 8,909 $ 9,870 $ 9,639 $ 9,870 $ 9,521
Max $ 22,042 $19,726 $ 20,136 $18,652 $ 22,518
Mean $11,526 $ 12,277 $12,024 $ 12,026 $12,168
Median $ 10,954 $ 11,511 $11,195 $ 11,260 $ 11,522
Standard deviation 2259.73 2175.21 2277.60 2115.73 2597.57
Table A.3.
Summary Statistics from 2011
Self Responsible and Charity Medicare Medicaid Private Dual Enrolled
Minimum $6,303 $9,420 $9,061 $9,240 $8,937
Maximum $ 19,084 $ 21,078 $ 20,345 $ 19,898 $ 20,609
Mean $ 10,764 $ 11,763 $ 11,542 $ 11,413 $ 11,577
Median $ 10,406 $ 11,122 $ 10,900 $ 10,646 $ 10,994
Standard deviation 2261.84 2195.68 2286.49 2144.70 2331.42
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Table A.4.


























Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
A.4 Appendix D: Charges by weights for patients Under 65 with inter-
actions
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A.5 Appendix E: Blinder Oaxaca with Average Income, White, High
Low Risk Dummy Interactions
Table A.5.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(1-4), White, and Low Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4
Differential
Prediction 1 11786.2∗∗∗ (126.4) 11672.3∗∗∗ (100.3) 11771.7∗∗∗ (108.8) 11777.9∗∗∗ (117.6)
Prediction 2 13849.8∗∗∗ (63.53) 13384.9∗∗∗ (44.05) 13566.0∗∗∗ (47.54) 13087.4∗∗∗ (39.74)
Difference -2063.6∗∗∗ (140.4) -1712.7∗∗∗ (109.3) -1794.3∗∗∗ (118.4) -1309.6∗∗∗ (123.9)
Decomposition
Endowments -597.3∗∗∗ (77.92) -386.5∗∗∗ (55.65) -113.1 (64.63) -259.5∗∗∗ (61.49)
Coefficients -1632.4∗∗∗ (273.2) -1240.6∗∗∗ (184.5) -1518.9∗∗∗ (287.9) -878.5∗∗∗ (221.9)
Interaction 166.1 (234.6) -85.58 (160.3) -162.3 (257.4) -171.5 (202.1)
Observations 38946 68447 65229 75335
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.6.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(5-8), White, and Low Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 11659.4∗∗∗ (133.5) 11571.6∗∗∗ (130.6) 11646.1∗∗∗ (139.5) 11573.3∗∗∗ (135.7)
Prediction 2 12622.5∗∗∗ (39.32) 12573.5∗∗∗ (38.19) 12610.6∗∗∗ (37.43) 12348.8∗∗∗ (37.15)
Difference -963.1∗∗∗ (138.8) -1001.9∗∗∗ (135.9) -964.5∗∗∗ (144.1) -775.5∗∗∗ (140.5)
Decomposition
Endowments -214.7∗∗∗ (58.29) -143.8 (85.22) -167.1∗ (65.96) -258.0∗∗∗ (61.93)
Coefficients -977.3∗∗∗ (296.4) -944.9∗∗∗ (249.5) -582.2 (373.3) -861.0∗∗∗ (219.5)
Interaction 228.9 (259.5) 86.80 (230.5) -215.2 (346.6) 343.5 (188.9)
Observations 71857 86350 79221 87091
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.7.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(1-4), White, and High Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4
Differential
Prediction 1 13391.5∗∗∗ (661.1) 12233.2∗∗∗ (441.5) 12130.2∗∗∗ (471.2) 12961.3∗∗∗ (490.5)
Prediction 2 14067.3∗∗∗ (282.4) 13633.4∗∗∗ (184.0) 14653.3∗∗∗ (268.1) 13231.2∗∗∗ (196.7)
Difference -675.8 (719.2) -1400.3∗∗ (477.8) -2523.1∗∗∗ (540.3) -269.9 (527.8)
Decomposition
Endowments -1378.3∗∗∗ (353.6) -1205.9∗∗∗ (233.8) -1263.7∗∗∗ (331.3) -431.7 (266.4)
Coefficients -1931.3∗ (782.4) -309.2 (741.5) -2016.4∗∗ (649.3) 1269.5∗ (542.2)
Interaction 2633.8∗∗∗ (678.9) 114.8 (668.2) 757.0 (551.7) -1107.7∗ (443.5)
Observations 1577 3142 2795 3050
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.8.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(5-8), White, and High Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 13355.0∗∗∗ (652.4) 13753.1∗∗∗ (978.2) 12594.1∗∗∗ (674.2) 13215.9∗∗∗ (762.9)
Prediction 2 13460.6∗∗∗ (209.3) 13372.8∗∗∗ (218.4) 13294.4∗∗∗ (197.7) 13500.2∗∗∗ (202.9)
Difference -105.7 (684.5) 380.2 (1001.8) -700.4 (700.8) -284.3 (789.0)
Decomposition
Endowments -189.6 (317.6) -250.1 (363.5) -343.2 (303.3) -294.0 (463.0)
Coefficients -216.7 (622.9) 3956.8∗ (1886.5) -39.97 (568.1) 368.3 (679.2)
Interaction 300.7 (657.8) -3326.5 (1709.6) -317.2 (591.4) -358.6 (828.3)
Observations 2800 2658 2781 3102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.9.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(1-4), Black, and Low Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4
Differential
Prediction 1 11870.5∗∗∗ (75.70) 11822.6∗∗∗ (109.7) 11546.5∗∗∗ (122.8) 11235.6∗∗∗ (117.6)
Prediction 2 14789.4∗∗∗ (38.82) 13949.2∗∗∗ (45.67) 13626.1∗∗∗ (50.88) 13279.0∗∗∗ (52.83)
Difference -2918.9∗∗∗ (84.67) -2126.6∗∗∗ (118.1) -2079.6∗∗∗ (132.4) -2043.5∗∗∗ (128.3)
Decomposition
Endowments -1004.4∗∗∗ (50.94) -718.8∗∗∗ (64.94) -600.1∗∗∗ (66.21) -622.5∗∗∗ (71.75)
Coefficients -2262.9∗∗∗ (168.9) -1301.4∗∗∗ (272.2) -1333.4∗∗∗ (233.4) -1420.4∗∗∗ (181.0)
Interaction 348.4∗ (153.1) -106.3 (238.8) -146.2 (202.4) -0.620 (152.1)
Observations 114564 72210 54012 51691
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001




Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(5-8), Black, and Low Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 11271.3∗∗∗ (135.9) 11445.0∗∗∗ (156.3) 11173.4∗∗∗ (155.1) 11531.1∗∗∗ (209.2)
Prediction 2 12932.2∗∗∗ (55.86) 12926.7∗∗∗ (56.83) 12779.7∗∗∗ (53.28) 12638.6∗∗∗ (72.04)
Difference -1660.9∗∗∗ (146.5) -1481.7∗∗∗ (165.7) -1606.4∗∗∗ (163.7) -1107.5∗∗∗ (220.9)
Decomposition
Endowments -470.0∗∗∗ (66.83) -475.5∗∗∗ (97.83) -403.8∗∗∗ (70.61) -514.6∗∗∗ (96.04)
Coefficients -1166.1∗∗∗ (256.0) -1237.1∗∗∗ (190.9) -866.1∗∗∗ (240.0) -1053.4∗∗∗ (258.8)
Interaction -24.87 (217.7) 230.9 (168.0) -336.5 (211.5) 460.5∗ (185.7)
Observations 39768 38765 39114 22155
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.11.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(5-8), Black, and High Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 14446.0∗∗∗ (889.9) 12371.4∗∗∗ (607.2) 13216.8∗∗∗ (722.4) 16711.8∗∗∗ (1544.1)
Prediction 2 14482.9∗∗∗ (287.1) 14191.4∗∗∗ (343.0) 13814.5∗∗∗ (301.9) 14298.4∗∗∗ (554.1)
Difference -36.91 (935.3) -1820.0∗∗ (695.6) -597.6 (782.5) 2413.4 (1621.6)
Decomposition
Endowments -569.6 (480.2) -1635.6∗∗∗ (438.8) 599.2 (698.3) -869.0 (756.3)
Coefficients 598.5 (1378.1) -898.4 (872.3) -3249.9∗∗ (1148.9) 3666.3∗∗ (1385.5)
Interaction -65.86 (1214.7) 714.0 (861.5) 2053.0 (1200.6) -384.0 (1454.7)
Observations 1545 1460 1560 800
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.12.
Blinder Oaxaca Demposition with Ave. Income(5-8), Black, and High Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile 5 Quantile 6 Quantile 7 Quantile 8
Differential
Prediction 1 14446.0∗∗∗ (889.9) 12371.4∗∗∗ (607.2) 13216.8∗∗∗ (722.4) 16711.8∗∗∗ (1544.1)
Prediction 2 14482.9∗∗∗ (287.1) 14191.4∗∗∗ (343.0) 13814.5∗∗∗ (301.9) 14298.4∗∗∗ (554.1)
Difference -36.91 (935.3) -1820.0∗∗ (695.6) -597.6 (782.5) 2413.4 (1621.6)
Decomposition
Endowments -569.6 (480.2) -1635.6∗∗∗ (438.8) 599.2 (698.3) -869.0 (756.3)
Coefficients 598.5 (1378.1) -898.4 (872.3) -3249.9∗∗ (1148.9) 3666.3∗∗ (1385.5)
Interaction -65.86 (1214.7) 714.0 (861.5) 2053.0 (1200.6) -384.0 (1454.7)
Observations 1545 1460 1560 800
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.7 Appendix G: Sensitivity to Treatment: Readmission Inpatient Qual-
ity Indicators
Some diagnoses are more sensitive to treatment than others. The Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has identified Inpatient Quality Indicators
(IQI). These indicators ”include conditions for which mortality has been shown to vary
substantially across institutions and for which evidence suggests that high mortality
rates may be associated with deficiencies in the quality of care.” (AHRQ and Quality,
2014)
Selecting patients with these diagnoses highlighted by the IQI, using ICD-9-CM
diagnostic codes, I restrict my sample to those patients who suffer from an illness
identified as sensitive to treatment. While these categories have been identified as
sensitive for mortally, I also investigate their effects on readmission for individuals
under 65. A priori, one would expect that uninsured IQI individuals receiving less
services would be readmitted at higher rates than uninsured non-IQI individuals.
In Table 8, column 1 shows the regression results for IQI readmissions with an
uninsured dummy and average income by zip code.
The first thing to observe is that coefficient on ‘uninsured’ in column 1 (.683)
is about 6 percentage points less than in the full sample (.743). This means that
uninsured individuals who have IQI diagnoses are less likely to get readmitted than
all patients (under 65).
Column 2 of Table 8 shows results of readmission for patients with IQI diagnoses
by average income quantile. The most notable result is the coefficient on ‘uninsured’.
In this specification, this coefficient is measuring the difference in readmission rates
for insured versus uninsured individuals who reside in zip codes in the bottom 1
8
of
average income. Uninsured individuals from these low income zip codes are readmit-
ted 63.6% as often as insured. The second major result is the relative lack of variation
among all insured individuals and all uninsured individuals. It seems like the critical
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Table A.13.




Iuninsured 1 0.683∗∗∗ (0.0208) 0.636∗∗∗ (0.0457)
ave income by zip 1.000∗ (0.000000567)
Iincome gr 2 0.940∗ (0.0267)
Iincome gr 3 0.989 (0.0286)
Iincome gr 4 1.039 (0.0325)
Iincome gr 5 1.008 (0.0327)
Iincome gr 6 0.944 (0.0318)
Iincome gr 7 0.976 (0.0338)
Iincome gr 8 0.912∗ (0.0341)
IuniXinc 1 2 1.093 (0.117)
IuniXinc 1 3 1.036 (0.115)
IuniXinc 1 4 0.960 (0.101)
IuniXinc 1 5 1.138 (0.125)
IuniXinc 1 6 1.146 (0.136)
IuniXinc 1 7 1.102 (0.128)
IuniXinc 1 8 1.278∗ (0.157)
N 233570 233570
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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factor is the presence of insurance, and income is much less important. Insured IQI
individuals in the top income quantile tend to be readmitted at lower rates than other
insured individuals, while uninsured individuals in the top quantile are readmitted
more frequently than uninsured patients in lower quantile.1
Similarly, I investigate the likelihood of readmissions on non-IQI patients. We
would assume these patients would be less sensitive to treatment, and as such, would
expect more muted results than for the IQI patients.
Table A.14.




Iuninsured 1 0.772∗∗∗ (0.0137) 0.615∗∗∗ (0.0281)
ave income by zip 1.000 (0.000000329)
Iincome gr 2 0.982 (0.0187)
Iincome gr 3 1.018 (0.0195)
Iincome gr 4 1.006 (0.0208)
Iincome gr 5 1.052∗ (0.0218)
Iincome gr 6 1.001 (0.0209)
Iincome gr 7 1.005 (0.0215)
Iincome gr 8 0.978 (0.0218)
IuniXinc 1 2 1.319∗∗∗ (0.0833)
IuniXinc 1 3 1.060 (0.0706)
IuniXinc 1 4 1.287∗∗∗ (0.0806)
IuniXinc 1 5 1.331∗∗∗ (0.0873)
IuniXinc 1 6 1.367∗∗∗ (0.0946)
IuniXinc 1 7 1.349∗∗∗ (0.0917)
IuniXinc 1 8 1.526∗∗∗ (0.104)
N 934024 934024
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
1Given that IQI diagnoses were identified as those that were sensitive to treatment, it is surprising to
find that for these diagnoses, readmission rates were lower than readmission rates for all diagnoses.
If uninsured patients received fewer services, one would imagine they would have higher rates of
readmission for the diseases that are very sensitive to treatment. Detailed analysis of which services
were provided and at what levels is left to subsequent work.
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In column 1 of Table 9, the coefficient on ‘Uninsured’ is .772; uninsured individu-
als without IQI diagnoses are 77% as likely as insured individuals to be readmitted.
In column 2, with income interactions, uninsured individuals with non-IQI diagnoses
who live in the bottom quantile of income are as 61.5% as likely to be readmitted.
As with the insured individuals with an IQI diagnosis in Table 8, there is very little
variation in readmission rates for any level of average income among insured indi-
viduals. Uninsured individuals without an IQI diagnosis have a different pattern of
readmission. The coefficients and errors for uninsured, non IQI patients are plotted
in Figure 6.
Among the uninsured non IQI patients, individuals in the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th
quantiles are all about 30% more likely to get readmitted than those uninsured indi-
viduals in the bottom income quantile. As in the full sample, uninsured individuals
living in the wealthiest zip codes are more likely to be readmitted than those in less
affluent zip codes.
A.8 Appendix F: Length of Stay and Time Between Admissions
Robustness checks for readmission results: Time between visits In Table
10, we saw uninsured individuals under 65 were 72% as likely to be readmitted to the
hospital as their insured counterparts. One might imagine that even though these
are acute illnesses requiring overnight hospitalization, that individuals have some
capacity to ‘time’ their readmission to the hospital. If that were the case, perhaps
what is driving the result that uninsured individuals are less likely to be readmitted is
that uninsured patients are postponing care beyond the 30-day window that defines a
readmission. If we saw support for the theory that uninsured individuals were delaying
care, we would expect to see a distribution of readmission times with a higher mean
than for the uninsured individuals. Summary statistics can be seen below. Note
all individuals below are under 65. In the summary statistics, there is no evidence
that uninsured individuals wait longer to seek readmission. To look if this ability of
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Table A.15.
Time between readmission by payer type
Insurance Class Mean Standard Deviation
Medicaid 13.9 8.2
Private Insurance 13.4 8.0
Uninsured 12.5 8.4
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Fig. A.1. Logit: Readmission for Non-IQI Under 65 with income interactions
patients to influence their date of readmission was what was driving the result, I have
created a distribution of times between discharge and readmission to the hospital
by payer class. For the purposes of illustration, I have graphed Uninsured patients,
Medicaid, Private insurance, and all patients (Total). The following histograms show
the time that has elapsed between the last admission and the next visit to the hospital.
From these distributions it seems that uninsured individuals have a different pat-
tern of readmission than their insured counterparts in the very early period after
being released from the hospital. For the first five days or so, uninsured individuals
return to the hospital at double the rates of their uninsured counterparts.
To better understand what factors influence the time between subsequent admis-
sions (up to 60 days), I run a regression on time between admissions and control for
types of disease, age, etc.
93
Fig. A.2. Time between Visits: Uninsured, Medicaid, Private Ins.
Notice that in the Table, the coefficient on Uninsured in column 2 is both very
small and insignificant. For individuals living in zip codes in the bottom 1
8
of the aver-
age income distribution, insurance status does not predict time between consecutive
admissions. In fact, when one looks at insured individuals across income categories,
there is little variation in the time between visits. At most it is about .7 days or less
than 17 hours. Given that the average time away is about 22.5 days, this variation is
fairly insignificant. For uninsured individuals there is about a 1 day reduction in time
between visits for the lowest income quantile, but then little variation for the next
4 quantiles (2,3,4,5). The highest three income quantiles have substantial reductions
in time between visits with 2 days less for quantile 6, 3.5 days less for quantile 7 and
4.75 days less for the highest income uninsured.
The question remains, though, why do uninsured individuals have an initial spike
in readmissions. One theory is that uninsured individuals who need a major procedure
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Table A.16.
Time Between visists: Uninsured and Ave Income Interactions
(1) (2)
Time Interactions
uninsured==1 -1.6143825∗∗∗ (0.1708867) -0.006401854 (0.3874471)
Black 0.8748875∗∗∗ (0.08255084) 0.8592704∗∗∗ (0.08356232)
Married -0.2327008∗∗ (0.08935114) -0.2362986∗∗ (0.08937809)
Seperated 0.1755054 (0.2084138) 0.1677914 (0.2083951)
Divorced 0.1931207 (0.1251261) 0.2045250 (0.1251409)
Widow/er 0.3278824∗∗ (0.1171288) 0.3335622∗∗ (0.1171310)
income groups8==2 -0.1734736 (0.1370761)
income groups8==3 -0.3484314∗ (0.1404526)
income groups8==4 -0.4589804∗∗ (0.1470338)
income groups8==5 -0.6945232∗∗∗ (0.1490466)
income groups8==6 -0.5730408∗∗∗ (0.1505829)
income groups8==7 -0.4022986∗ (0.1568301)
income groups8==8 -0.5989535∗∗∗ (0.1650503)
Uninsured income2 -0.9579977 (0.6083940)
Uninsured income3 -0.7941942 (0.5918455)
Uninsured income4 -1.1863758 (0.6139970)
Uninsured income5 -0.9413719 (0.6077268)
Uninsured income6 -2.0080148∗∗ (0.6338382)
Uninsured income7 -3.5046939∗∗∗ (0.6104041)
Uninsured income8 -4.7424810∗∗∗ (0.6328836)
Observations 221576 221576
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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might return home for a night to save the expense of staying in the hospital. To
investigate this empirically, running a regression on length of stay would inform if
insurance status and average income were a good predictor of length of stay. As a
robustness check, I excluded readmissions in the first three days after leaving the
hospital. Results did not change appreciably.
Table A.17.
Length of Stay: Uninsured and Ave Income Interactions
(1) (2)
Length of Stay Length of stay interactions
uninsured==1 -0.04443884∗ (0.01837747) -0.1362901∗∗∗ (0.04104730)
Black 0.09581459∗∗∗ (0.01017150) 0.1088681∗∗∗ (0.01029887)
Married -0.2328788∗∗∗ (0.01098457) -0.2354867∗∗∗ (0.01098885)
Seperated -0.03537612 (0.03030945) -0.03565102 (0.03030956)
Divorced 0.009114482 (0.01784573) 0.005833278 (0.01784938)
Widow/er -0.06241945∗∗∗ (0.01672531) -0.06474998∗∗∗ (0.01672731)
income groups8==2 0.09213176∗∗∗ (0.01783987)
income groups8==3 0.1005392∗∗∗ (0.01785896)
income groups8==4 0.1236147∗∗∗ (0.01850741)
income groups8==5 0.09634154∗∗∗ (0.01863656)
income groups8==6 0.08567305∗∗∗ (0.01854327)
income groups8==7 0.08142438∗∗∗ (0.01917792)
income groups8==8 0.03670833 (0.01974922)
Uninsured income2 0.01290092 (0.06285501)
Uninsured income3 0.07256237 (0.05993899)
Uninsured income4 0.07797528 (0.06325025)
Uninsured income5 0.1752733∗∗ (0.06339308)
Uninsured income6 0.1328046∗ (0.06640591)
Uninsured income7 0.1209582 (0.06644391)
Uninsured income8 0.2189164∗∗ (0.06904879)
Observations 1454215 1454215
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
When we consider the full interaction between income quantiles by zip code and
insurance status, we see that for insured individuals, length of stay decreases with
income, but that all estimates, while econometrically significant are not particularly
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economically significant. The range of coefficients is less than .13 days or about three
hours. The average length of stay is 4.3 days.
We also observe that uninsured individuals from the bottom quantile of the average
income distribution have lengths of stay that are about .136 days shorter than their
insured counterparts. While highly statistically significant, economically, this is fairly
inconsequential, as it translated to a four hour shorter stay or a reduction of time in
the hospital of 3%. There is more variation in length of stay among the uninsured by
average income quantiles. Uninsured individuals from the wealthiest zip codes stay
about 8.5 hours longer than uninsured individuals from the poorest zip codes.
A.9 Appendix H: Sensitive to Treatment: Mortality IQI
A.9 In Table 13, for individuals under 65 who have an IQI diagnosis, there is no
statistical difference in the rates of mortality for insured or uninsured individuals.
This is surprising, as IQI diagnoses were specifically identified as those which were
sensitive to treatment, but this does not translate into a differential effect on mortality.
Table 14, we have results for the non˙IQI patients. Selected coefficients are plotted
in Figure 8. We see increased mortality for uninsured individuals under 65 living in
wealthy zip codes compared to all other groups. The mortality rate for uninsured
individuals living in the top 3
8
of zip codes rises to about 3 times that of uninsured
individuals living in the poorest zip codes. For illnesses that were identified as non-
IQI, or less sensitive to treatment, there seems to be a sizable, statistically significant
increase in mortality for uninsured individuals who live in zip codes in the top 3
8
of
average income. This is particularly surprising given that for individuals who have
diagnoses identified as sensitive to treatment (IQI), there is no difference in mortality
between insured and uninsured, for all income zip code quantiles.
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Table A.18.





income groups8==2 1.052 (0.0664)
income groups8==3 1.115 (0.0737)
income groups8==4 0.985 (0.0681)
income groups8==5 1.032 (0.0762)
income groups8==6 0.940 (0.0696)
income groups8==7 0.933 (0.0725)
income groups8==8 1.015 (0.0813)
Unisured income2 0.638 (0.147)
Unisured income3 1.092 (0.248)
Unisured income4 1.078 (0.233)
Unisured income5 0.733 (0.178)
Unisured income6 0.750 (0.186)
Unisured income7 1.296 (0.305)
Unisured income8 1.062 (0.264)
Observations 218088
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001









income groups8==2 1.070 (0.0866)
income groups8==3 0.810∗ (0.0724)
income groups8==4 0.947 (0.0830)
income groups8==5 0.903 (0.0844)
income groups8==6 0.934 (0.0838)
income groups8==7 0.916 (0.0869)
income groups8==8 0.913 (0.0898)
Unisured income2 1.078 (0.347)
Unisured income3 0.956 (0.342)
Unisured income4 1.175 (0.372)
Unisured income5 1.665 (0.523)
Unisured income6 2.255∗∗ (0.682)
Unisured income7 3.719∗∗∗ (1.094)







Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Fig. A.3. Marginal Effect of income on un/insured U65 nonIQI mortality
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Table A.20.




Ins low black 0.941∗ (0.0235) 0.915 (0.0835)
Insured highrisk 1.320 (0.278) 14.38∗∗∗ (5.613)
Ins high black 1.304 (0.256) 13.37∗∗∗ (4.901)
Uninsured lowrisk 0.721∗∗∗ (0.0511) 0.724 (0.226)
Unins low black 0.521∗∗∗ (0.0257) 1.064 (0.198)
Uninsured highrisk 1.500 (0.472) 27.60∗∗∗ (15.78)
Unins high black 0.766 (0.209) 12.22∗∗∗ (5.973)
Unin low income2 1.230∗ (0.105) 1.291 (0.484)
Unin low income3 0.956 (0.0835) 1.724 (0.643)
Unin low income4 1.038 (0.0894) 1.619 (0.574)
Unin low income5 1.173 (0.102) 1.544 (0.573)
Unin low income6 1.169 (0.104) 1.312 (0.491)
Unin low income7 1.157 (0.105) 1.894 (0.710)
Unin low income8 1.261∗∗ (0.112) 2.093∗ (0.766)
Unins low B inc2 1.084 (0.0895) 0.538 (0.188)
Unins low B inc3 1.045 (0.0948) 0.676 (0.249)
Unins low B inc4 1.335∗∗∗ (0.106) 1.119 (0.315)
Unins low B inc5 1.329∗∗ (0.115) 0.880 (0.301)
Unins low B inc6 1.311∗ (0.141) 1.048 (0.393)
Unins low B inc7 1.228∗ (0.116) 2.294∗∗ (0.678)
Unins low B inc8 1.412∗∗ (0.154) 0.922 (0.394)
Unin high income2 0.832 (0.252) 0.455 (0.259)
Unin high income3 0.528 (0.174) 0.481 (0.286)
Unin high income4 0.720 (0.222) 0.629 (0.334)
Unin high income5 0.806 (0.253) 0.706 (0.403)
Unin high income6 0.763 (0.241) 0.779 (0.411)
Unin high income7 0.604 (0.198) 2.195 (1.135)
Unin high income8 0.664 (0.216) 1.679 (0.869)
Unin high B income2 0.841 (0.293) 0.668 (0.404)
Unin high B income3 1.462 (0.492) 2.366 (1.307)
Unin high B income4 0.904 (0.301) 0.820 (0.475)
Unin high B income5 1.411 (0.458) 0.941 (0.535)
Unin high B income6 1.314 (0.508) 2.226 (1.386)
Unin high B income7 1.657 (0.538) 3.525∗ (1.760)
Unin high B income8 0.618 (0.340) 3.298∗ (1.738)
Observations 1172205 1103714
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B. APPENDIX FOR: HOSPITAL-INSURER
BARGAINING POWER AND NEGOTIATED RATES
B.1 Understanding Variation in Fee For Service Payments
In this section, we explore the variation in FFS payments, and some of the issues
with using charge master prices as a measure of services. We assume that FFS
payments are negotiated as a fraction of charges. If all variation in FFS payments
were explained by this negotiated fraction, then a regression of log(payments) against
log(charges) should result in a coefficient of 1 on log(charges), and and R2 of 1.
Specifically, estimating the model:
log(paidj) = β0 + β1 log(chargedj) + εj (B.1)
for all patients j who were admitted at hospital h with insurance i should result in
estimates of β̂1 = 1 and R







ρhi = exp(β0) (B.3)
These ρhis tell us the fraction of charges that a homogenized patient would pay for
a particular hospital-insurer combination. As such they allow us to compare relative
prices between hospital-insurer pairs.
We begin with Table B.1 by exploring the variation in FFS payments and charges
due to characteristics such as hospital type, location, and insurance and hospital
market share. These regressions are used to motivate our analysis based on a nor-
malization of charges, rather than charges themselves.
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Before interpreting the coefficients on these regressions, it is worthwhile noting
that, given a long enough time horizon, all of these market characteristics are en-
dogenous. While we expect hospital location, teaching status, and the presence of an
emergency room to be choice variables for the hospital only in the very long run, and
hence fixed for the purposes of a particular negotiation, market share clearly varies
directly with the negotiation process. We therefore invite the reader to be cautious
in interpreting the coefficients on market shares as causal.1
We have four specifications. The first specification examines payments and charges
on a per-patient basis. The second specification explains payments considering illness
heterogeneity by interacting illness weight and hospital type. The third specifica-
tion explains charges again by considering illness heterogeneity by interacting illness
weight and hospital type. The final specification uses normalized charges to explain
payments.
In Table B.1 column (1), we regress log(payments) against log(charges), hospital
type indicators, region indicators, and measures of market share of hospitals and
insurers. For FFS payments, we expect the coefficient on log(charges) to be equal to
one. While we reject this hypothesis at the 5% level, the coefficient of 0.940 indicates
a close to linear relationship between payments and charges.2
We next turn our attention to hospital type. Of some concern in column (1) is the
negative and significant coefficient on the academic medical center (AMC) indicator.
The comparison group of hospital type is community hospitals, which we think of as
being highly substitutable. We predicted community hospitals would have limited
bargaining power. AMCs are high-quality specialized hospitals, so we expected this
1Specifically, we expect hospital (insurer) market share to be correlated with unobservable hospital
quality (insurance policy) characteristics that are important in the negotiating process. For example,
we expect higher quality hospitals to command both (i) greater market shares and (ii) greater
negotiated rates. As quality is unobserved and therefore an omitted variable, this would mean that
the estimated coefficient on market share would over-state the effect of having a greater market share.
Hence the estimates are an upper bound of the causal affect of a hospital or insurer commanding a
greater market share in the negotiation.
2One thing to observe is that this suggests that patients with higher charges may pay a slightly
smaller fraction of the bill than patients with lower charges. This may be attributable to budget
constraints. If patients pay 10% of their bills through coinsurance, patients with bills in the upper
tail of the distribution may struggle to pay even the coinsurance fraction of their bill.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(paid) log(paid) log(charged) log(paid)
log(charged) 0.937∗∗∗
(0.0109)
Academic MC -0.481∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0365) (0.0277) (0.0332)
Community DSH 0.0793∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.0361 0.160∗∗∗
(0.0352) (0.0391) (0.0297) (0.0357)
Teaching -0.0182 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0323 0.0719∗
(0.0293) (0.0331) (0.0251) (0.0292)
TraumaCenters 0.161∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.0400 0.0702∗
(0.0316) (0.0298) (0.0226) (0.0316)
Central Mass -0.0568 -0.237∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗
(0.0423) (0.0473) (0.0359) (0.0425)
North East Mass -0.211∗∗∗ -0.104∗ -0.00933 -0.145∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0426) (0.0323) (0.0399)
Metro Boston 0.497∗∗∗ 0.0328 -0.0483 0.528∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0289) (0.0388)
South Eastern Mass 0.163∗∗∗ 0.00504 -0.220∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗
(0.0424) (0.0460) (0.0349) (0.0428)
Log hospital market share (DRG weight) 0.143∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0119)
Log insurer market share (DRG weight) -0.131∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.00451) (0.00451)
Academic MC × log(DRGweight) 0.266∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0190)
Community × log(DRGweight) 0.294∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0225)
Community DSH × log(DRGweight) 0.269∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.0301) (0.0228)




Constant -0.705 7.557∗∗∗ 8.116∗∗∗ 8.514∗∗∗
(0.520) (0.465) (0.352) (0.526)
Observations 43889 9797 9797 43462
R2 0.220 0.167 0.403 0.228
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.1.
Relationship between payments and charges for Fee For Service pay-
ments. All regressions control for sex, race, ethnicity, and age (poly-
nomial). Hospitals classified as “other specialty” have been omitted
from these regressions.
coefficient to be positive. The reason for this unexpected sign is investigated in
columns (2) and (3).
Column (2) in Table B.1 regresses log payments against various controls for mar-
ket characteristics, and investigates the relationship between DRG weights (which
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capture illness heterogeneity) and payments.3 One can interpret the coefficients on
the hospital type indicators as (approximately) the fraction markup over a commu-
nity hospital for a DRG weight of one. Note here that academic medical centers are
estimated to receive 1.57 = exp(0.454) times the payment compared to a community
hospital for a patient with a DRG weight of 1. This coefficient, unlike the corre-
sponding coefficient in column (1), is in line with our expectations that AMCs are
the high-quality hospitals, and hence command higher prices.
The coefficient AMC × Log weight of .267 should be interpreted as follows. For
an increase in DRG weight of 1, payments would increase by a factor of exp(0.267) =
1.306, or 30.6%.
Column (3) changes the dependent variable in the regression, and regresses log(charges)
against the same regressors as column (2). This estimation highlights the discrepancy
noted in column (1) where the AMC indicator’s coefficient was expected to have a
positive sign. The coefficient on AMC in column (3) is significantly positive, indicat-
ing that AMC’s charges are uniformly higher. Therefore, an insurer with the same
negotiated rate (as a fraction of charges) at a community hospital and an AMC would
be charged more at the AMC.
Notice, though, when we compare columns (2) and (3), that AMC have much higher
charges than the community hospitals. AMCs have much higher prices than their
community counterparts, but they only get payments that are a fraction higher.
This observation motivates the normalization of charges. We normalize hospital
charges by creating a hospital charge index which compares each patient’s charges to
estimated charges at that hospital for a DRG of 1. This procedure is described in
detail in Section B.2.2.
We call this variable log(Imputed Weight) and use it instead of raw charges in
the same specification as column (1). The results of this are reported in column (4) of
3Here we include log(weightj) interacted with all hospital type indicators to allow for more flexibility
in this relationship. Typically in specifications with interactions, one includes a ‘linear’ term for the
interacted variable alone. In this specification, however, since we interact weight with every hospital
type, to include weight (uninteracted), we would have to omit the effect of an increase in weight on
a particular hospital type.
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Table B.1. Here we see that AMCs command payments of about 1.155 = exp(0.143)
times higher than community hospitals, and an additional 7% if they have a trauma
center. When we compare our results to Ho (2008), who estimates ‘star’ hospitals
to have markups of 25%, we find similar results (about 23%). We also include log
market share by DRG weight, and estimate that a 1% increase in market share of
a hospital is associated with a 0.257% increase in negotiated payments, and a 1%
increase in market share of an insurer is associated with a 0.127% decline in negotiated
payments. Again, due to suspected correlation with unobservable quality attributes,
we consider these value to be upper bounds on the causal effects of these variables in
the negotiation process.
B.2 Procedure for calculating negotiated rates
Our goal is to estimate the negotiated rates between hospitals and insurers in the
market for health care. To this end, we must estimate:
1. An index of relative hospital charges. Specifically, for each hospital we estimate
the amount that a patient with a DRG weight of 1 would be charged.
2. Negotiated rates for each hospital-insurer pair (i.e. how much is paid for services
for a normalized patient4, and how this varies for each hospital-insurer pair?)
The remainder of this section outlines the procedure.
B.2.1 Index of relative hospital charges
In Section B.1,we find a patient’s charges varies greatly by hospital, even after
normalizing differences in DRG weight.5 As we aim to estimate negotiated rates
as a fraction of charges, we wish to control for this variation so that a normalized
4Normalized in this context means for a patient with a DRG weight of 1
5For example, we would imagine hospitals at the top of the referral network to treat sicker patients.
When we say we are controlling for DRG weights, what we mean is that we are comparing charges
per DRG weight. Thus we can compare charges as if patients were homogeneous and each had an
average illness.
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“charge” buys the same quantity of services at each hospital.6 As a motivation for
this normalization, consider two hospitals, one with low costs and charges and one
with high costs and high charges. $5,000 of charges at Hospital L(ow) would buy
more services than $5,000 at Hospital H(igh). Our normalization allows us to look at
percentage changes in service provision relative to a standard unit of service.7
We first calculate an index of hospital charges that is equal to the estimated (log)
charges that a patient with a DRG weight of 1 would receive. To achieve this, we
estimate the following equation for every hospital twice, once for FFS and once for
DRG payments:
log(chargedj) = β0,h + β1,h log(weightj) + εj (B.4)
where weightj is patient j’s DRG weight. Taking the conditional expectation of (B.4)
for a weight of 1 yields:
E
[
log(chargedj) | weightj = 1
]
= β0,h (B.5)
Using the estimated intercept from (B.4), we then construct:
log(normalized chargesj) = log(chargedj)− β̂0,h (B.6)
That is, if two patients at different hospitals have the same normalized charges, (say
1.5) we expect that they each receive 1.5 times as many services as a normalized
patient at their hospital. the same quantity of services, but their (un-normalized)
charges could be different.8 Furthermore in expectation, log(normalized chargesj) = 0
6One can roughly think of this as the ratio of actual charges to the charges a patient would receive
if they had a weight of 1 (i.e., charges for an average patient) at that hospital. Precise details on
our methodology for constructing these normalized charges are below
7A standard unit of service is one with a DRG weight of 1, and is not dependent on patient case
mix.
8Because this specification is in logs, this is more clear if you consider 2 patients both of who receive
2 times the average service provision at two different hospitals. Both would have a normalized
charge of 2. At hospital A, average charges may be $8,000. At hospital B, average charges may
be $10,000. The patient at Hospital A would receive $16,000 of services and at Hospital b would
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corresponds to the quantity of services that would be provided for a DRG weight of
1.9
B.2.2 Procedure for estimating negotiated rates for FFS payments
Fee-for-service (FFS) payment arrangements are negotiated payments between a
hospital and an insurer specifying either amounts to be paid for each service provided
by the hospital, or the fraction of the hospital’s charges that will be paid. Due to the
availability of data, we make the simplifying assumption that all FFS contracts are
a negotiated fraction of charges, noting that the alternative would be a negotiated
price vector for services, say phi. If phi = ρhich for some ρhi ∈ (0, 1), where ch is
hospital h’s charge master prices, then these types of arrangements are identical.
We seek to estimate the fraction of charges that each insurer pays to each hospital.
Additionally, noting that charges for the same services vary greatly between hospitals,
we also estimate the amount paid by an insurer for one unit of normalized payments.
For a FFS arrangement, the relationship between charges and payments should
be:
paidj = ρhichargedj, ⇐⇒ log(paidj) = log(ρhi) + log(chargedj) (B.7)
where ρhi is the fraction of charges paid by insurer i at hospital h. We estimate (B.7)
by regressing log(payments) against log(charges) for all patients in a hospital-insurer
pair:
log(paidj) = β0,hi + β1,hi log(chargedj) + εj (B.8)
receive $20,000, but each receives twice the average, so they each have a normalized charge of 2. In
this way, normalized charges tells us the relative amount of service consumption at each hospital
without explicitly comparing dollar values.
9and for small x, log(normalized chargesj) = x corresponds to a DRG weight of approximately 1+x.
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Hence, our estimated for negotiated rates as a fraction of services are:
ρ̂hi = exp(β̂0,hi) (B.9)
Note that between (B.7) and (B.8) we allow for β1,hi 6= 1, that payments are not
directly proportional to charges.
We also estimate the amount paid for normalized charges using the regression
equation:
log(paidj) = β0,hi + β1,hi log(normalized chargesj) + εj (B.10)
again, allowing for a nonlinear relationship between payments and normalized charges
through estimating (rather than imposing a value on) β1,hi. Our estimate of the
amount paid for a unit of normalized charges is therefore:
γ̂hi = exp(β0,hi) (B.11)
Note that the units of γ̂hi are in US dollars, while ρ̂hi is unit-free.
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B.3 Estimates of negotiated rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Aetna Blue Cross Cigna Fallon United Tufts ALL
Anna Jaques 0 1539.2 0 0 4072.7 0 2158.2
(.) (312.2) (.) (.) (1424.0) (.) (400.4)
Baystate MC 0 3320.1 7786.1 4853.6 7792.0 0 4794.6
(.) (210.6) (906.8) (617.0) (1052.4) (.) (245.9)
Baystate Franklin MC 0 2264.1 0 0 0 0 4061.5
(.) (486.9) (.) (.) (.) (.) (574.0)
Baystate Mary Lane 0 2639.7 0 0 0 0 4301.0
(.) (883.1) (.) (.) (.) (.) (979.3)
Brigham and Women’s 22001.1 7559.8 19721.4 10682.3 11954.0 13640.7 13279.2
(296.5) (193.2) (813.6) (958.8) (1003.1) (245.6) (163.9)
Signature Healthcare Brockton 0 2186.7 0 0 5639.6 7102.1 3248.0
(.) (215.4) (.) (.) (1446.4) (652.9) (274.4)
Cape Cod 10620.6 3770.7 0 0 9507.6 9897.4 6300.0
(887.0) (298.7) (.) (.) (1657.1) (666.1) (337.7)
Falmouth 0 4130.9 0 0 0 12880.7 7385.6
(.) (499.2) (.) (.) (.) (1029.8) (540.3)
Steward Norwood 0 0 0 0 5107.2 7106.3 5924.0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (1362.5) (455.0) (392.3)
Steward Carney 0 1247.1 0 0 5972.2 5910.0 3529.9
(.) (452.6) (.) (.) (1413.2) (942.0) (469.2)
Boston Children’s 14984.2 4115.8 13830.8 0 0 16476.6 7753.3
(648.9) (234.4) (1191.8) (.) (.) (746.6) (276.6)
Cooley Dickinson 0 0 0 2672.1 0 6189.5 4331.9
(.) (.) (.) (647.1) (.) (737.2) (557.2)
Beth Israel -Needham 0 1332.6 0 0 0 0 3510.8
(.) (709.7) (.) (.) (.) (.) (819.3)
Emerson 0 3645.1 0 0 5333.5 8707.9 5640.4
(.) (318.1) (.) (.) (1548.1) (504.2) (328.7)
Brigham and Women’s-Faulkner 0 3258.9 0 0 8358.4 8408.0 5785.9
(.) (360.5) (.) (.) (1838.4) (680.1) (392.8)
Harrington Memorial 0 2071.9 0 3743.8 0 0 3609.1
(.) (448.9) (.) (575.0) (.) (.) (438.0)
Health Alliance 0 0 0 3560.8 7307.0 0 4487.0
(.) (.) (.) (520.7) (1711.4) (.) (495.2)
Heywood 0 1933.4 0 2725.0 0 6122.7 3018.7
(.) (333.0) (.) (633.2) (.) (793.8) (364.6)
Steward Holy Family 0 2380.4 0 0 7229.3 7645.2 5250.3
(.) (352.1) (.) (.) (960.1) (557.3) (324.5)
Holyoke MC 0 2003.5 0 0 6521.8 0 3415.8
(.) (421.6) (.) (.) (1815.3) (.) (489.6)
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Beth Israel -Plymouth 0 2906.4 0 0 5173.5 7347.6 4219.3
(.) (291.3) (.) (.) (1862.4) (620.3) (344.7)
Lawrence General 0 0 0 1702.6 0 7638.9 5907.0
(.) (.) (.) (886.1) (.) (580.6) (523.5)
Lowell General 0 2908.2 0 0 5985.2 7898.8 4998.2
(.) (215.4) (.) (.) (963.4) (376.3) (230.6)
Massachusetts Eye and Ear 0 0 0 0 0 5013.7 4743.4
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (1165.6) (857.7)
Massachusetts General 17153.6 2823.5 14790.3 0 9857.6 12197.0 8859.3
(323.9) (157.6) (892.8) (.) (692.3) (233.0) (148.4)
Milford Regional MC 0 2541.9 0 3900.3 5065.3 8892.4 4184.2
(.) (366.5) (.) (690.7) (1771.5) (824.2) (372.0)
Beth Israel - Milton 0 1964.2 0 0 4480.5 5127.1 3493.5
(.) (445.2) (.) (.) (1862.4) (695.1) (458.9)
Morton 0 1839.7 0 0 5710.9 5596.8 3059.0
(.) (316.7) (.) (.) (1674.6) (873.4) (375.0)
Mount Auburn Hospital 0 4995.8 0 0 7668.5 0 5558.3
(.) (360.5) (.) (.) (1771.5) (.) (456.2)
New England Baptist 0 24610.1 0 0 22275.1 17304.6 20279.9
(.) (553.2) (.) (.) (2029.5) (1005.6) (541.7)
Newton-Wellesley 8682.5 3677.5 9894.2 0 7754.0 10388.0 7505.2
(433.6) (225.4) (1249.9) (.) (1308.3) (287.2) (203.0)
North Adams Regional 0 2543.9 0 0 0 0 4013.2
(.) (501.8) (.) (.) (.) (.) (663.5)
Quincy MC 0 1551.2 0 0 0 5672.4 3597.0
(.) (553.2) (.) (.) (.) (799.6) (549.3)
Steward Saint Anne’s 0 1241.2 0 0 6848.0 8204.4 4860.8
(.) (491.7) (.) (.) (1260.2) (858.5) (451.9)
South Shore 8577.8 3135.5 7649.7 0 7374.2 10134.7 6404.5
(724.2) (196.8) (1332.4) (.) (1084.8) (304.8) (201.1)
Steward St. Elizabeth’s MC 0 4354.7 0 0 8885.8 10427.9 8241.3
(.) (417.1) (.) (.) (1362.5) (408.9) (328.4)
Saint Vincent 4973.1 2871.1 0 5172.7 5929.9 9631.6 5396.6
(668.0) (358.6) (.) (240.4) (1291.7) (553.3) (217.9)
Sturdy Memorial 0 5628.2 0 0 5156.2 7138.8 5864.2
(.) (257.7) (.) (.) (1507.5) (805.6) (318.9)
Clinton 0 0 0 0 0 0 3927.5
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (954.1)
Marlborough 0 2120.3 0 3007.6 8731.3 8507.0 4458.5
(.) (515.4) (.) (1023.2) (2029.5) (1184.3) (528.9)
Winchester 0 3010.9 6241.1 0 4903.9 10028.8 6278.8
(.) (249.9) (1613.6) (.) (1592.1) (347.0) (253.3)
Wing Memorial 0 1710.9 0 0 0 0 4050.9
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(.) (819.5) (.) (.) (.) (.) (785.7)
North Shore MC 10410.2 2964.4 0 0 7242.5 10180.5 5577.3
(499.1) (241.9) (.) (.) (1413.2) (766.5) (276.4)
Boston MC 0 2828.3 0 0 5593.4 7310.2 4384.8
(.) (217.7) (.) (.) (703.9) (511.8) (236.3)
Cambridge Health Alliance 0 1471.7 0 0 3048.7 5714.7 2274.3
(.) (255.3) (.) (.) (1862.4) (746.6) (331.7)
MetroWest MC 0 1924.7 0 1568.5 5374.7 0 2393.0
(.) (250.3) (.) (905.2) (1482.1) (.) (323.6)
Hallmark Health 0 2493.4 0 0 5204.6 9299.1 5339.6
(.) (591.9) (.) (.) (1446.4) (932.5) (505.7)
Northeast 0 3438.0 0 3569.3 5297.2 9438.8 5466.6
(.) (199.7) (.) (877.1) (1372.2) (360.3) (220.1)
Southcoast 7766.9 2317.5 7651.3 3144.4 8808.1 7674.9 4748.2
(607.5) (175.7) (1493.9) (995.9) (848.7) (381.3) (194.5)
UMass Memorial MC 0 1100.5 11978.5 4698.0 7385.2 12213.5 6551.8
(.) (567.8) (1363.8) (256.9) (820.0) (491.5) (223.7)
Berkshire MC 11209.2 0 0 0 9862.0 11012.2 10150.3
(781.1) (.) (.) (.) (1136.8) (881.1) (460.7)
Lahey Clinic 0 4419.4 0 7065.2 9412.1 11588.1 7275.7
(.) (213.2) (.) (1085.3) (813.8) (415.4) (227.6)
Mercy MC 0 1787.4 0 3485.0 0 6019.0 2965.1
(.) (310.4) (.) (792.6) (.) (914.4) (374.5)
Steward Good Samaritan MC 0 2348.3 0 0 6416.5 7031.2 4392.8
(.) (249.0) (.) (.) (1362.5) (422.1) (268.1)
Beth Israel Deaconess MC 0 3317.7 9080.4 0 7741.2 14187.4 8010.5
(.) (168.9) (1007.2) (.) (755.4) (261.5) (171.6)
Observations 1267 14563 644 2188 3650 7894 31719
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Fig. B.1. Restricted and unrestricted exponentiated coefficient plot
for estimates of coefficients on hospital indicators. The green dots
show the exponentiated coefficients of the restricted model, which
regresses the log paid to charged ratio against hospital and insurer
indicators (uninteracted). The red triangles show the exponentiated
coefficients of the unrestricted model, which regresses log payments
against log charges, hospital indicators, and insurer indicators (unin-
teracted). As the omitted hospital is Anna Jacques, the value of the
exponentiated coefficient should be interpreted as the ratio of pay-
ments to charges relative to Anna Jacques. E.g.: a hospital with a
coefficient equal to 0.7 has an average paid to charged ratio that is
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Fig. B.2. Restricted and unrestricted exponentiated coefficient plot
for estimates of coefficients on insurer indicators. The green dots show
the exponentiated coefficients of the restricted model, which regresses
the log paid to charged ratio against hospital and insurer indicators
(uninteracted). The red triangles show the exponentiated coefficients
of the unrestricted model, which regresses log payments against log
charges, hospital indicators, and insurer indicators (uninteracted). As
the omitted insurer is Aetna, the value of the exponentiated coefficient
should be interpreted as the ratio of payments to charges relative to
those paid by Aetna. E.g.: an insurer with a coefficient equal to 0.7
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